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Al-Dulaimi reveals the resistance’s conditions for the Al-Zaidi government: Iraqi sovereignty, independent decision-making, and ending the foreign presence.

Anbar Alliance leader Abdul Sattar Ahmed al-Dulaimi revealed on Tuesday that the resistance has stipulated to the al-Zaidi government the end of the foreign presence, respect for the country’s sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs in exchange for its participation in the political process, free from American dictates.

Al-Dulaimi told the Information Agency, “The Islamic resistance has stipulated to the government of Ali Faleh al-Zaidi the end of the role of American forces and the so-called international coalition forces, the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern Iraq, the return of the islands, oil fields, and lands encroached upon by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, respect for Iraq’s sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs in exchange for its participation in the political process, free from American interference in shaping the country’s policies.”

He added, “The resistance rejected the plan of the new Emir of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Tom Barak, as it falls within a scheme to weaken Iraq and end the role of the resistance against the occupier, and opens the door wide to targeting resistance fighters under pretexts whose objectives have become transparent.” He clarified that “the surrender of the resistance’s weapons also depends on similar measures for the surrender of weapons by the Kurdish Peshmerga and Asayish forces, and addressing both issues.”
He added, “The Zaidi government is required to treat the Peshmerga and Asayish forces as forces outside the control of the central government.” Iraqeconomic news

Almaalomah.me

Erbil: A large US military convoy departs Harir base

Informed sources confirmed on Monday that a large convoy of US forces departed from Harir Air Base near Erbil, under tight security measures, as part of the ongoing gradual withdrawal from the base.

The sources explained to Al-Maalomah that “a convoy comprising dozens of vehicles carrying military equipment and others consisting of metal containers left Harir Air Base near Erbil in the early hours of the morning. It is believed that the convoy included military supplies, equipment, and devices.”

They added that “the convoy is part of the gradual withdrawal of US forces from the base, which is now almost entirely devoid of American presence, except for the external guards and some helicopters.”

The sources indicated that “the equipment is believed to have headed towards the Iraqi-Turkish border, and from there to the US base in Turkey,” noting that “the main entrances to the base are still under tight security measures, coinciding with the ongoing gradual withdrawal from this base, which has served as a major headquarters for US forces for many years.”

Almaalomah.me

“Al-Maalomah” reveals the contents of an American message to the Barzani government… What does it contain?

A responsible source in Sulaymaniyah province revealed on Tuesday the contents of an American message to the Kurdistan Regional Government, which he said included Washington’s options regarding the region’s status during the next phase.

The source told Al-Maalomah News Agency that “Masoud Barzani’s government received a message carried by US envoy Tom Barak, which included two options with no third alternative: the first is to integrate the region’s forces with the regular forces under the supervision of the federal government, and the second is to stop the financial aid provided by Washington to the regional government, in addition to stopping the air support provided to the Peshmerga forces and protecting the region’s airspace from external attacks.” Financialnews aggregation

The source indicated that “the gist of the message confirms that the Barzani government has no option but to respond to the demands of the Trump administration regarding the integration of Kurdish forces of all kinds into the regular forces, without any restrictions or conditions.”

He indicated that “the US administration threatened dire consequences that the Barzani government might bear if the message’s contents were not implemented on the ground.”

Almaalomah.me

“One basket” is Al-Zaydi’s way to fill the vacancies: a discussion with Al-Maliki to resolve the issue.

On Tuesday, an informed government source revealed a proposed mechanism for completing the cabinet in the event that political agreement cannot be reached on candidates for the vacant ministries or their distribution among the political forces. This coincided with a visit by the head of the State of Law Coalition, Nouri al-Maliki, to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi to discuss the same issue.

The source informed Shafaq News Agency of the details of the inability to finalize the candidates for the vacant ministries, including the security ministries (Interior and Defense), and the continued state of disagreement between the political forces and leaders.

According to him, this will push towards passing the candidates according to the “single basket” mechanism, to complete the government cabinet headed by Ali al-Zidi, who was authorized by most of the political forces to choose whomever he sees fit for the vacant ministries.

The mechanism will also include the positions of deputy prime ministers, in order to avoid a political veto, given that the Kurdish forces have not yet agreed on who should hold the position of deputy prime minister, whether it belongs to the Kurdistan Democratic Party or the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, according to the source.

In a related context, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi received Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, and discussed with him the importance of continuing understandings and dialogues between national political forces to complete the formation of the government, as well as supporting the government’s efforts in combating corruption, achieving reforms, and consolidating stability.

In addition, the government source pointed out that “the coordination framework, after the conclusion of the celebrations marking the withdrawal of US forces from the entire country, will appoint a delegation to visit the Kurdistan Region to decide on the identity of the second deputy prime minister, in addition to the candidates for the ministries that fall within the Kurdish share in the federal government.

According to the source, the government cabinet will be completed after the conclusion of the Sovereignty Day ceremonies and events, noting that a televised speech by the Prime Minister on behalf of Iraq will be broadcast on this occasion, and this matter was discussed in previous meetings of the coordination framework.

On May 14, the Iraqi parliament voted to approve Ali al-Zaidi’s government and its ministerial program, including 14 ministers. Voting on the remaining nine ministries was postponed until further notice due to ongoing political disagreements over the distribution of portfolios, amid reports of international warnings against including armed factions in the new cabinet.

Since then, the coordination framework has authorized Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi to make contacts with the heads of the political blocs and entities participating in the government, whose candidates for the vacant ministries have not yet been decided up to the time of writing this report.

Shafaq.com

Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries are recording their highest recovery in oil exports since February.

Data from Kpler showed that crude oil exports from major Middle Eastern producing countries rebounded in September to 16.328 million barrels per day, the highest level since the outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Iran last February, as Saudi Arabia and the UAE increased their exports. Businessnews alerts

Preliminary data revealed that this recovery came in the wake of a rebound in exports through the Strait of Hormuz, which were expected to reach about 9.719 million barrels per day this month, as Saudi Arabia diverted its oil exports from the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea following attacks that damaged the kingdom’s East-West pipeline, according to Reuters.

According to Kpler data, despite the recovery in exports from the region, which includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Iran, they are still about 3.2 million barrels per day lower than the 19.513 million barrels per day level in February.

This includes shipments transiting the Strait of Hormuz, including ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman, shipments from the ports of Fujairah in the UAE and Oman outside the Strait of Hormuz, and exports via the Red Sea.

Kpler said in a note on Monday that it “estimates crude oil exports from the Middle East to be just under 80 percent below pre-conflict levels.”

The data showed that Saudi Arabia, the region’s largest exporter, is on track to ship around 5.4 million barrels per day this month, up from 2.446 million barrels per day in August.

According to the data, September shipments from Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura port in the Gulf jumped to about 3.25 million barrels per day, compared with 929,000 barrels per day in August, but are still below the 6.411 million barrels per day level recorded in February.

Kpler data showed that a total of 19 supertankers, each carrying two million barrels of Saudi oil, left the Strait of Hormuz last week.

These figures exclude any ships that may have crossed the strait with their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transceivers switched off to avoid detection.

Before the outbreak of war with Iran on February 28, the Strait of Hormuz typically received about 125 large commercial vessels daily, including oil and gas tankers, bulk cargo ships and container ships, representing about 20 percent of the world’s daily supply of crude oil and liquefied natural gas.

Shafaq.com

The American withdrawal from Iraq: between illusion and reality

One day later, on September 30, 2026, the withdrawal of the United States and international coalition forces from Iraq will reach its announced and final date. Thus, a military phase that has extended, in various forms, since 2003 will end, and the Iraqi state will enter a new phase in which it is supposed to bear greater responsibility for its security, its airspace, the pursuit of ISIS, and the protection of its institutions and borders. But the problem begins precisely here, because the end of the foreign military presence does not necessarily mean the completion of sovereignty, and the departure of the forces does not automatically resolve the question of who possesses power, who decides to use it, and who has the ability to protect the state when it is threatened. Iraqtravel guides

The official Iraqi discourse has treated September 30 as a moment of restoring sovereignty, a description that is politically understandable, but not sufficient from a strategic standpoint. Sovereignty is not merely the absence of foreign forces from the land, but rather the state’s ability to monopolize security and military decisions, protect its airspace, pursue armed groups outside its institutional structure, and prevent its territory from being used as a platform for others’ conflicts. Therefore, the day after the withdrawal will, in reality, be the most difficult test for the Iraqi state, not the end of the test.

The most striking paradox is that the withdrawal will be completed by the end of September, while Iraq has not yet resolved the issue of weapons outside the state’s full control. Prime Minister Ali al-Zubaidi has moved from the date he previously proposed to end the issue of the factions’ weapons on September 30 to a new plan ending on June 30, 2027. According to the announced plan, the process begins with a ninety-day de-escalation phase during which the factions refrain from launching attacks, in exchange for not being targeted by the American forces. Then the process of transferring weapons to the authority of the state will begin gradually until the end of next June. The American envoy confirmed that Washington and Baghdad agree that, by that date, the state will have the military monopoly.

But the problem is that this timetable does not have the consensus of the factions; some of them demanded that the deadline be extended to the end of 2027, while reservations appeared within the same coordination framework about setting a binding date, considering that setting a strict time limit may complicate negotiations with the armed factions. Herein lies the gray area that Iraq will find itself in after September 30: foreign forces leave, but the state’s monopoly on weapons is not achieved on the same day. This means that the state will enter a new phase and is required to manage the balance between armed forces that possess military and political capabilities, and a declared governmental commitment to restoring the power to the institutions of the state.

This is the difference between withdrawal and sovereignty; withdrawal is a military decision that can be scheduled and implemented, while sovereignty is a long institutional process that does not begin and end with a timetable. If foreign forces leave and the power remains distributed between the state and multiple loyalist factions, the vacuum left by the withdrawal will not necessarily be a geographical vacuum, but may turn into a vacuum in the decision-making center. This does not mean that Iraq is entering a phase devoid of military capability, as Iraqi forces have proven in recent years their ability to carry out operations against the remnants of ISIS, including the use of Iraqi F-16 aircraft in airstrikes targeting the organization’s hideouts in the Kirkuk and Salah al-Din regions. In September alone, Iraqi forces carried out airstrikes against the organization’s positions, and also conducted continuous ground and security operations.

But the existence of this capability does not negate another question: Can the Iraqi system maintain the same level of efficiency without international support in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, technical support, training, and maintenance? This is the real test that will begin after the withdrawal. Iraq is not starting from scratch, but it also does not transition from dependence on the coalition to self-sufficiency simply by the departure of the last foreign soldier. More importantly, ISIS is no longer a force controlling cities and territories as it was before 2017, but it has not disappeared from the security landscape. On September 27, the village of Al-Malha in Kirkuk Governorate was attacked with mortar shells, and security sources reported the death of a woman and the injury of civilians. On the same day, Iraqi forces clashed with militants wearing suicide belts near Altun Kupri, resulting in the death of two of them and the injury and arrest of a third. These incidents do not mean that ISIS has returned to its former strength, but they confirm that the organization still possesses the ability to move, hide, and carry out operations in rural, mountainous, and desert areas. Therefore, the question after the withdrawal is not: Has ISIS returned? But the question is: Can the Iraqi state prevent the remnants of the organization from turning areas with fragile security into spaces to rebuild its capabilities? Iraqtravel guides

Hence, Kirkuk and the contact zones become more important; the disputed areas are not just a security geography, but an area where the responsibilities of the Iraqi army and the Peshmerga intersect, and the issue of security coordination becomes complicated. Any weakness in coordination can turn into a loophole that the organization can exploit. Therefore, the American withdrawal puts Baghdad and Erbil in front of the necessity to move from situational coordination to building a more clear joint security system in the areas where responsibilities overlap.

In the Kurdistan Region, however, the matter is more sensitive. The withdrawal is not limited to leaving bases in Baghdad or the federal areas, but also includes the forces and defense systems present in the region. The Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs announced on September 28 that the departure of US and coalition forces on September 30 would leave the region without an air defense system, and considered that protecting the region’s airspace, as part of Iraqi airspace, falls under the responsibility of the federal government. Herein lies one of the most sensitive paradoxes of the new phase. The Kurdistan Region does not have an independent decision regarding air defense, because the airspace is part of Iraqi sovereignty, while its own capabilities in this field are limited. Thus, the Kurdish question after the withdrawal becomes an Iraqi question as well: Can Baghdad provide protection for the region’s airspace as it provides it for the rest of Iraq? And can the security relationship between the Iraqi army and the Peshmerga be transformed from a temporary arrangement into a genuine federal defense system?

This question becomes even more important due to the attacks the region has suffered in recent months. On September 28, three marches targeted a camp of the Iranian Kurdish opposition in the Koya area, southeast of Erbil, continuing a series of attacks on sites within the region during the regional escalation. This means that the region is entering a phase of withdrawal in a volatile regional environment, not in a stable security situation where the departure of the American defense umbrella can be treated as a mere administrative transition. Conversely, on September 21, Kurdistan witnessed an important institutional step represented by the official announcement of the unification and reorganization of the Peshmerga forces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, after many years of two military structures linked to the two main political forces in the region. The ministry announced that the forces are now within a unified command and control structure, while the presidency of the region confirmed that the unification represents the beginning of a new phase. However, the value of this step should not be measured by its political celebration alone, but rather by what it will produce on the ground. Institutional unification acquires its true meaning when military decision-making becomes unified, the chain of command is clear, funding, arming, and training are subject to a single institution, and loyalty is to the institution, not to political forces. Different readings have already emerged regarding the extent to which this transformation has been practically completed, making the next stage the actual test of unification, not merely its announcement.

Here, the paths of Baghdad and Erbil can converge at a single point; Baghdad is required to confine weapons to the state, and Erbil is required to transform the unification of the Peshmerga into a stable military institution; and in both cases, the legal formula alone is not enough. The modern state is not based only on the existence of institutions that bear official names, but rather on the existence of a clear decision-making chain capable of implementing what it decides. Therefore, the withdrawal of the United States places Baghdad and Erbil before an opportunity and a test at the same time; the opportunity lies in redefining the Iraqi security relationship on the basis of the state and institutions, and the test lies in the ability of the two parties to build joint defense arrangements that do not make the region a security zone separate from Iraq, and do not make Baghdad view the security of the region as a secondary issue; and if Iraqi airspace is one constitutionally, then the responsibility for protecting it must also be one in practice.

On the political level, Iraq will enter a more sensitive phase in its relationship with Washington and Tehran after September 30. The direct American withdrawal will reduce the American military presence inside Iraq, but it does not mean the end of the Iraqi-American relationship. Other forms of security, intelligence, and defense cooperation may continue through new bilateral arrangements, which makes the military withdrawal different from a political and strategic separation. At the same time, the end of the American military presence removes one of the main arguments used by armed factions to justify the continuation of their weapons. However, this does not mean that the issue of weapons will end automatically. Armed factions have announced that they link giving up weapons to the withdrawal of foreign forces, while the government says that the state’s monopoly on weapons is necessary to move to the new phase. Iraqtravel guides

Thus, after September 30, the question may shift from one about the presence of foreign forces to a more profound one: What does the state do when there is no longer a foreign presence that can be held responsible for security lapses? At that point, the government’s ability to impose unified rules, manage weapons, protect airspace, control borders, and deal with internal threats will become the standard by which the state will be measured. From this perspective, the relationship with Iran must also be viewed without simplification; Iraq is located in a region where Iranian, American, and Turkish interests overlap, and it cannot erase this reality simply by withdrawing a military force from its territory. What is required is not for Iraq to move from one umbrella to another, but rather to build the capacity of a state that allows it to manage its foreign relations from a more balanced institutional position.

As for the Kurdistan Region, it will face a more complex equation: the need for continued international cooperation on the one hand, and the need to develop its defense capabilities within the Iraqi framework on the other. Therefore, the practical option does not seem to be in refusing to withdraw, nor in ignoring its risks, but rather in building new arrangements that include air defense, intelligence sharing, coordination between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi army, and continued training and technical support through bilateral relations with the countries that participated in supporting Iraq and the region during the past years.

The most dangerous thing that could happen is for Iraq to treat September 30 as the end of the problem, when in reality it is the beginning of a new phase of responsibility. The withdrawal of foreign forces may close a military chapter, but it opens a more difficult political and security chapter. In this chapter, the question will not be: Did the Americans withdraw? That is a given. Rather, the question will be: Can the state fill the space left by the withdrawal? A state that wants full sovereignty needs a capable army, an effective air force, air defenses that protect its airspace, intelligence agencies that have information before danger occurs, political institutions capable of making decisions, and weapons that no other party disputes. It also needs a clear federal relationship between Baghdad and Erbil, because security in Iraq cannot be divided in a way that makes a threat in Kirkuk a federal issue and a threat in Erbil a regional issue, while the airspace, borders, and regional threats are one and the same.

Therefore, the American withdrawal should not be viewed as a complete victory, nor as an inevitable catastrophe. It is a strategic event that shifts responsibility more heavily onto the Iraqi state, while simultaneously revealing the level of preparedness of its institutions to bear that responsibility. If Baghdad and Erbil succeed in transforming the post-withdrawal phase into one of building joint security institutions, the departure of foreign forces could mark a different beginning for the relationship between the state and its institutions. However, if weapons remain dispersed, security decisions fragmented, air defense absent, and federal coordination fragile, then the withdrawal alone will not create sovereignty. Sovereignty does not begin with the departure of foreign soldiers and end at the borders. Sovereignty begins when decisions regarding war and peace, weapons, defense, and security become a single institutional decision. On September 30, a long military presence will end, but the real question will begin the following day: Has Iraq become capable of protecting itself, or has it merely moved from a stage of dependence on foreign power to a stage of testing its ability to build its own strength?

Shafaq.com

Between concessions and tensions… who will open the door to completing the cabinet?

MP Hamid Abbas stressed on Wednesday the necessity of turning the page on political disputes and prioritizing the supreme national interest among all parties and forces to ensure the completion of the cabinet formation within the specified timeframes and to enable state institutions to perform their duties more effectively and stably.

Abbas told Al-Maalouma, “The continued wrangling and bickering over filling the remaining ministerial portfolios does not serve the path of political and executive stability, but rather negatively impacts the pace of service delivery and the follow-up on strategic projects awaited by the Iraqi public.” He explained that “the current stage requires genuine cooperation and transcending narrow interests.”

He added that “completing the cabinet with ministers who possess competence, integrity, and administrative ability is a fundamental step to enhance institutional performance and prevent any administrative vacuum that could affect the reconstruction and development process.” He called on “political blocs to intensify consultations and make mutual concessions in order to resolve this issue and proceed with the government program without obstacles.”

Almaalomah.me

At Trump’s invitation, al-Zaidi participates in a regional meeting in New York

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi participated on Tuesday evening, Baghdad time, in a multilateral meeting called for by US President Donald Trump, on the sidelines of the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

The Prime Minister’s Media Office stated in a statement received by Shafaq News Agency that the meeting was attended by the heads of delegations from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Oman, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Turkey, in addition to the United States of America. FinancialNews Reports

The statement added that the meeting addressed a number of regional and international issues and files, most notably strengthening security and stability, protecting global trade and securing supply chains, as well as maintaining development levels in the region’s economies.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi arrived in New York on Monday to participate in the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Shafaq.com

Al-Zaidi is campaigning in New York to accelerate oil projects and strengthen economic partnerships.

In New York, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi discussed economic and energy developments with the International Monetary Fund, HKN, and ExxonMobil, stressing the government’s intention to accelerate oil projects and expand partnerships with international companies, in addition to proceeding with fiscal policy reform. FinancialNews Reports

This came in separate statements issued by his media office early Wednesday morning, on the sidelines of his participation in the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly.

During his meeting with Jihad Azour, Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department at the International Monetary Fund, Al-Zaydi discussed the repercussions of the crisis in the region and its impact on markets, prices, supply chains, and inflation rates, as well as its effects on energy consumption and oil prices.

He stressed that the government is proceeding with restructuring the basic pillars of fiscal policy in Iraq, through expanding the automation system and gradually moving towards a program and performance budget within the 2027 budget project, while Azour confirmed the Fund’s readiness to continue cooperation with Iraq and strengthen the path of economic and financial reforms.

In another meeting with the chairman of the board of directors of the American company HKN, Ross Perot, Al-Zaidi called on the company to “redouble its efforts, accelerate the pace of work, and increase execution hours” in its projects and contractual obligations in Iraq, especially with regard to increasing oil production.

He noted the government’s intention to organize the Baghdad Energy Conference, which will witness the announcement of new exploration blocks in Iraq, stressing that the government will work to overcome obstacles and address problems that could delay the implementation of projects and companies’ commitments.

Al-Zaidi also discussed with ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods prospects for cooperation and partnership in the areas of oil exploration and development of operating fields, stressing the importance of expanding partnerships with major international companies and benefiting from their expertise and modern technologies to develop the oil sector and enhance investment efficiency in natural resources.

Shafaq.com