A US report calls on Washington to focus on Iraqi politics, not “leaders”.
The Atlantic Council called on the United States to focus its Iraq policy not on individuals and leaders, but on strengthening institutional processes, arguing that although outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani appears to be “the safest option,” this perspective conflates personal leadership qualities with the deeper structural problems that have historically plagued Iraq.
After the American Institute said in a report translated by Shafaq News Agency that it is still uncertain whether Al-Sudani will get another government mandate, it explained that the government coalition talks will not only lead to the formation of the next government, but will also contribute to determining Iraq’s direction towards future challenges.
Between Maliki and Sudanese
The US report said that many in Washington believe that al-Sudani is different from Nouri al-Maliki, the only prime minister to have served two terms in the post-Saddam Hussein era, adding that this “assumption is both comfortable and misleading.”
He went on to say that al-Sudani is often seen as focusing more on technical issues and causing less division, while leading a more stable country than before, a situation that suggests he is “the safest option,” suggesting that al-Sudani will continue to work with Washington on critical issues related to reform and the disarmament of militias in the next four years.
However, he pointed out that this view “confuses personal leadership qualities with the deeper structural problems that have plagued Iraq historically,” explaining that political elites view the state as a source of rewards, and therefore, in such a political landscape, a single leader who remains in power for a long time can turn temporary power into permanent control, noting that even competent leaders can weaken institutions if they remain for a second term.
Therefore, the American report considered that the main issue for the stability of Iraq is not whether al-Sudani is like al-Maliki, but whether the Iraqi political system allows for real competition, adding that the losing forces should be able to return to power through elections and negotiation, and that rivals can continue to compete within the system itself, rather than seeking power elsewhere.
He stressed that this form of competition is important for Iraq’s security, not just its democracy, explaining that political elites used ministries and agencies not only for political action, but also to manage alliances by distributing jobs, contracts, and security positions. He clarified that prime ministers like Haider al-Abadi, Adel Abdul Mahdi, and Mustafa al-Kadhimi were not “aggressive” enough and lost power, but despite that, they left the country more stable than their predecessors.
In comparison, the report said that “leaders who treated the state as ‘spoils of war’ and built strong patronage networks, such as Nouri al-Maliki, served longer,” noting that Iraqi prime ministers are often seen as pragmatic in their first term, as they assume office through a quota-sharing deal that divides ministries and top posts across blocs. It added that “under these constraints, prime ministers tend during their first term to minimize immediate friction between competing power centers and prioritize deals, including Baghdad-Erbil arrangements such as oil budget agreements.”
In addition, the report said that they are trying to contain armed factions through a combination of formal integration and selective pressure.
He continued that, in contrast, a second term changes the incentives by making it more rewarding to cling to power, adding that leaders who expect to stay longer often put loyal figures in top jobs, use government contracts to protect themselves, weaken oversight bodies, and use audits or investigations against their opponents.
According to the report, the Sudanese government resorted to such a move at the end of its first term, including by directing a federal oversight committee to audit the revenues and expenditures of the Kurdistan Regional Government.
The trap of the second term
The report argued that the “second term trap in Iraq” does not always lead directly to authoritarianism, but rather slowly transforms appointments, contracts, and implementation tools into a system that limits political change and weakens institutions.
After pointing to the experience of 2014, when military units collapsed during the fight against ISIS, with the blame being placed on corruption, weak leadership, political appointments, and sectarian divisions—problems that arise when security forces serve politics rather than operate as professional institutions—the report explained that “this is the main lesson of Maliki’s second term in office, which can be defined as the slippery slope toward the end of Iraq as a single, unified state.”
He went on to say that “the problem was not just the style of one leader, but the failure of institutions to prevent power from becoming too personal once someone had been in office for too long.”
He noted that Sudani’s supporters point to his focus on services, his style of governance, and what he provides for Iraqis, and that even his critics mostly acknowledge that he deals with competing pressures with discipline. However, he said that “in Iraq, a leader’s personal style cannot overcome deeper pressures for long, especially when seeking a second term.”
The report added that “if Sudani wins a second term, he is likely to use the state to consolidate his personal power in the absence of real checks and balances, a concern reflected in the veto power exercised by the Shiite Coordination Framework against his remaining in power.”
He went on to say that if Sudani were to win a second term, his coalition partners could impose strict demands and conditions on him, expecting Sudani to use his power to make appointments that would strengthen their networks and financial interests, help his allies, and counter rivals.
The report said that since 2014, things in Iraq have seen somewhat gradual improvements because prime ministers have not been able to see their authority as permanent, and that even during chaotic transitions, the belief that no leader is permanent has kept politics open and allowed for change. It noted that “this openness changes how political forces behave, as when they believe that losing an election means they can still bargain later, they are more likely to participate in elections, negotiate, and build alliances, and will be less inclined to use force.”
America and Iraq
The report stated that, based on this viewpoint, the real question for American policymakers is not about the personal qualities of the next Iraqi prime minister, but rather whether the political system is open enough to prevent the state from becoming a means to achieve the narrow interests of groups.
While the report noted the limited influence of the United States on Iraqi politicians, it said that if it were too direct, it could backfire by stirring up nationalism, aiding corrupt individuals, or if it appeared that the United States was choosing the leaders.
Therefore, the report considered that any good American strategy should be “cautious and focused” with the aim of supporting strong institutions and political change without supporting any one leader.
He went on to say that the American strategy should prioritize institutional processes, not individual leaders, to achieve stability.
The report concluded by saying that “the main question is not whether al-Sudani is like al-Maliki, but whether a second term will reduce competition and weaken institutions,” adding that “keeping the same leader can only help stability if there is real oversight and an opportunity for political change.”
Shafaq.com