The reform of the political system requires the settlement of differences between the Iraqi components

2017/05/21 (00:01 PM) - Number of readings: 112 - Number (3928)


The US leadership of the international coalition against Iraq has brought the country to the brink of defeating the Dahesh Group, which has taken over a third of the country. Soon, he will be expelled from Mosul, thanks to the efforts of the Iraqi security forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the popular mobilization forces.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi deserves the confidence to oversee the campaign.
On the other hand, the political system that was installed after the fall of Saddam's regime failed. Apart from the liberal democracy that many have long hoped for, Iraq is almost clerical - a rule of thieves - full of party, ethnic and sectarian division.

Therefore, the main components of Iraq (Sunnis and Shiites) should engage in meaningful dialogue. This should begin with negotiations between the federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government. The two sides should decide whether they want to live together, and that the place of the decision is Baghdad, not Ankara, Tehran or Washington.

Most Kurds aspire to independence, but if separation takes place, it must be according to a partitionable plan - like the "velvet divorce" between the Czechs and the Slovaks, not like Northern Cyprus or southern Sudan - negotiated with Baghdad. The Kurdish leadership may also feel the advantages of remaining part of a new confederal Iraq with the continued existence of a sovereign Kurdistan region contributing to a common economic and security structure. At the same time, the Kurdish leadership must work seriously to resolve the political and economic crisis and the crisis of governance in the region. As well as the components of the Arab - Sunni and Shiite - to decide on their political relationship in the future.

Shiite parties dominate the government and hesitate to share power for fear that this will allow the return of the Sunnis. It is true that Sunnis do not have credible leadership that represents them or challenges extremists. But the Shiites and the Kurds must recognize that the deprivation of Sunnis was a reason for embracing terrorism, and similarly Sunnis must recognize them as the biggest losers of violent extremism.

Economic growth is the second most important challenge facing Iraq's leaders. The significant increase in oil production since 2003 has not yet translated into a better standard of living for the population. Most of the revenue is spent on inflated public sector salaries.

The only way to save the failing rent economy is to establish a public body to plan and implement capital expenditure. Such a body - an investment and development council similar to what was in Iraq before the 1958 revolution - is under government administration and financed by allocating an annual percentage of oil and gas revenues to the national budget.

The Authority coordinates with private investors and international donors, and then develops a comprehensive capital expenditure plan for the country.
The main key is to ensure that the political factions are not assigned to the management of the Development and Investment Authority. Rather, they must be the responsibility of the stakeholders - the Iraqi people and the investors.

Iraq, reformed along these lines, could become a model for a new security and economic structure in the Middle East, a shift based on shared economic interests and encouragement.