Maliki expands its propaganda campaign to include Kirkuk
14-10-2013 | (Voice of Iraq)
Baghdad: «Middle East»
From Basra in the south to Kirkuk in the north seems to al-Maliki in a political movement and a permanent electoral at a time when political opponents counting him until his breath, both in terms of his or process steps.
After one day what he considered al-Maliki targeted attempts to weaken the Basra province and prevented from calling for progress to address these plots and deter those involved in attempts to weaken Basra. He called tribal province of Kirkuk (250 km) north of Baghdad disputed under Article 140 of the Constitution to support the Iraqi security forces to address the armed groups in the province. Maliki said in a telephone call open during a conference of tribal leaders in the province of Kirkuk, convened by the leadership of the band 12 in the Iraqi army in the area Kiwan, northwest of Kirkuk, on the support of the tribes of the security forces, said that «what is happening today is not an Iraqi, but is an extension of what is happening in Syria Egypt and Libya. Maliki said: «We have made significant gains when we reject the principle of Shiite and Sunni, but we were a setback of the crows of evil», pointing out that «could not control our small groups of Chechens and Afghans, Circassians and other powers do not want good for Iraq». Maliki called «Search security risk and leave the contentious issues», adding that «beneficiaries of sedition are criminal gangs and terror. Maliki considered that «the basic requirement is the security and unity of Iraq and avoid sectarian strife, Iraqi فكركوك like Basra and Sulaymaniyah», stressing that «Our problem is with the sectarian militias. For his part, the Kurdistan Alliance, expressed worry that what occurs Maliki in Kirkuk is a form of election propaganda through a kind of militarization of society. A member of the Iraqi parliament from the Kurdistan Alliance bloc Chuan Mohamed Taha told Al-Sharq al-Awsat, said that «the main problem that نعانيها in Iraq today is that there are blurry and confusion in everything which increases the crisis of confidence between the political partners. He said Taha, that «it becomes exciting attention and shapes together when they cling sustenance security tribes through the Salvation Councils or Sahwa, or what was announced by state law, where the intention to form popular committees to protect areas», adding that «this and in spite of all its consequences dangerous to the security of the country which is run this way, it is an early election propaganda. He pointed out that «if the Prime Minister stems from the reconciliation social This is a good thing, we need to, but it is clear for all observers that the synchronization of these and other issues with the elections, it enters the door campaigning that does not work does not serve the interests of the country under the continued deterioration of the security and political differences. And on Maliki's comments on Iraqi Kirkuk, said Taha, said that «the Kurdistan region is all part of Iraq, Kirkuk is also part of Iraq, and no one says otherwise, we are Iraqis and we made many sacrifices for democracy in Iraq, was and still is for us our contributions outstanding in the building Iraqi state, but logic and the right to make us say that Kirkuk is an Iraqi city, but the identity of Kurdistan, and this is not debatable. And on the forces of the Tigris, which carried out a security operation in the province and see the Kurds for their role after the deep divisions that erupted last year and should have led to an armed confrontation between the Federal Army and Kurdish Peshmerga forces, Taha said, that «Our position is clear from this and through coordination committees that have been formed between the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad, the Ministry of Peshmerga, which is to manage the security file in the disputed areas jointly. Taha said that «there are those who say that the political differences between the partners reflected on the security of the system and its performance while it is true that the politicization of the security system is reflected on the problems between the political forces and not vice versa. The band was 12 of the Tigris operations of the security process and has wide to track Msthdwi of the security forces in areas southwest of Kirkuk province. He said the division commander, Maj. Gen. Mohammed Khalaf Saeed al-Dulaimi said in a statement yesterday (Sunday), the joint force of the band 12 and the operations of the Tigris began, the implementation of the security operation range included the villages in the areas of Riyadh and Abbasi and Hawija, indicating that «the campaign came to track terrorist groups that operate ago period to target homes and the role of military and police personnel in areas southwest of Kirkuk. Dulaimi stressed that «the results of this process, which will last for two days, will be announced after the completion of them, pointing out that« those armed groups seeking through these operations, to deliver messages to the street as a present.
Kurdish Change Movement: Government's program is most important than positions
BAGHDAD / NINA / The leader figure of the Kurdish Change Movement, Mohamed Tawfik confirmed that the movement looks to the government program, which will be adopted in the Kurdistan region during the next four years, rather than government positions.
He said in a statement to the National Iraqi News Agency / NINA /: "The change movement began dialogues and consultations with the Democratic Party of Kurdistan on the next Government," adding that "the most important thing for us is not the posts , which we will get in the new government , but the government's program that will be adopted in the next four years in the region, and we have put conditions on all political parties that the government's program should be responsive to the aspirations of the Kurdish people , otherwise we will stay as political opposition."
This week, the United States and its allies will enter another round of negotiations with Iran, this one more hopeful as a result of Hassan Rouhani’s election as Iranian president and his repeated statements that he wants a deal to end Iran’s nuclear impasse.
One of the foundational assumptions of the American approach to these negotiations all along has been that the West doesn’t have time and the Iranians do. As a result, the United States has insisted that the talks cannot be allowed to drag on. They need to be concluded quickly. The rationale behind this assumption is that the Iranians care more about retaining their nuclear program than they do about having sanctions lifted, and their goal is merely to stave off worse measures by the West — either US or Israeli military operations, or even harsher sanctions — while they continue to enrich uranium and draw closer and closer to acquiring a breakout capability. (A breakout capability is the ability to quickly field a workable nuclear weapon. Although the term “quickly” is undefined and has changed significantly over the years, it is often described as meaning “faster than the West could act to prevent it.”)
It was not wrong or misguided to believe this. In the past, there was good reason to believe it was entirely correct. However, today, the evidence suggests that it is fundamentally mistaken, and that it is the Iranians, particularly Rouhani, who face time pressures more than the West.
Let’s start with the Iranian side. Rouhani is unquestionably looking to change Iran’s situation both internally and externally. In particular, he is undoubtedly looking for a deal on the nuclear program that, at the very least, would see Iran compromise on its enrichment program in return for sanctions relief. He may very well be willing to go further than that. Certainly, he has suggested as much.
The claims that Rouhani is a “wolf in sheep’s clothing,” that he does not represent a significant change in Iran’s demeanor, simply do not stand up to scrutiny. This is neither the time nor the place for a full explication of the evidence — there is too much to be presented in a short essay, and with the nuclear talks about to begin, Iran’s behavior in those talks should be allowed to stand as the best proof for either theory. Suffice it to say that the evidence so far available is overwhelming that Rouhani clearly wants change of some kind, and that he is already paying a price for it at home. He has been repeatedly attacked by Iran’s hard-liners, who are uninterested in a deal. But Rouhani has persevered, suggesting that this deal is important to him. He has twice said publicly that he needs the deal soon — in one instance, he argued for three to six months — because if he cannot demonstrate quickly to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and his hard-line rivals that he can secure meaningful compromises from the West, they will use his failure to curtail his room for further maneuver.
In fact, it's curious that Rouhani chose to make resolving the nuclear impasse his first major policy move. Most politicians would have chosen to start by tackling smaller, domestic problems related to Iran’s economy or political system as a way of racking up some quick wins to bolster their political position before turning to a major foreign policy gambit.
Moreover, this one is focused on a foreign policy problem that has proven utterly intractable for years; represents a core difference with Iran’s powerful hard-line faction; requires a deal that the supreme leader himself may oppose; and relies on Iran’s repeatedly proclaimed greatest adversary to do the right thing for the Islamic Republic. In many ways, it is a gamble of monumental proportions, which again should reinforce both our sense that Rouhani is serious about getting a deal and the notion that he is probably ready to make significant compromises to get it. But it also gives credence to Rouhani’s own warning that he needs this deal soon, or else his presidency could be crippled by its failure.
On our side, the evidence of the past few years gives reason to reassess our assumptions about Iran’s nuclear strategy. Of greatest importance, Iran has been deliberately refraining from pursuing a nuclear weapon as quickly as it could have. At first, many feared that once Iran began large-scale enrichment activities, it would simply enrich enough uranium for one bomb to weapons grade (90% purity or better) and then detonate a crude bomb. Iran achieved that capability in about 2008, yet they did not break out. Then, the fear was that once the Iranians accumulated enough low-enriched uranium (3.5% purity) for one bomb they would immediately enrich that to weapons grade and break out. Iran passed that benchmark in about 2010, and again they did not do so.
Next, the fear was that once Iran had acquired enough uranium enriched to 19.75% purity (sometimes called “medium-enriched uranium”) for one bomb it would immediately convert that to weapons grade and break out. Iran passed that benchmark in 2012, and again, it chose not do so. In fact, instead, Iran has regularly converted some of its “medium-enriched uranium” to plates for the Tehran Research Reactor (which make them difficult to further enrich for weapons), and it has done so to ensure that it has less than a bomb’s worth of medium-enriched uranium on hand at any time.
This behavior is important because it demonstrates that whatever Iran does ultimately intend for its nuclear program — and there should be no doubt that its current nuclear program is a military program meant to produce weapons, not a civilian program meant to produce electricity — Tehran has consciously decided not to break out and race for an arsenal and has held to that policy for at least five years. Israel’s former chief of military intelligence, Amos Yadlin, and Israeli nuclear expert Yoel Guzansky have called attention to this important pattern, noting that “Iran is not advancing toward the bomb at as rapid a pace as it could. It appears to realize that such progress would bring with it negative strategic repercussions.”
Just why Iran has chosen not to go ahead and weaponize remains a mystery, but there are at least four powerful factors that, taken together, probably have convinced Tehran not to do so for now. These include the threat of an Israeli or (more likely) American military attack; fear that the United States would greatly ramp up its covert action and cyberwarfare campaigns against Iran if it decided to weaponize; fear that the Saudis would obtain nuclear weapons of their own if Iran did; and, of greatest importance to my mind, fear that the Chinese and Indians would join the Western sanctions against Iran because Beijing and New Delhi have made it clear to Tehran that while they do not support a war against Iran, they are dead-set against an Iranian nuclear arsenal.
What’s important about these factors is that all remain firmly in place. If they have been adequate to dissuade Iran from exercising its breakout capability for the past five years, it is likely that they will continue to do so for some time to come. Indeed, in spring 2013, both President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly stated that it would take Iran a year or more to field a workable nuclear weapon from a decision to do so (a decision that has not been given). That is a pretty wide breakout window, and it will take some time — probably several years — for Iran to narrow it significantly. Thus, even if we continue to fear that Tehran’s game is to play for time until it has narrowed that breakout window — a claim inconsistent with Rouhani’s current behavior, but perhaps what Iran’s hard-liners have in mind — we do not need to fear that Iran will be in that position for some time to come.
This is neither an argument for complacency nor for lowballing the Iranians on the assumption that we are now in a more advantageous bargaining position than they are. We simply do not know what Rouhani will ultimately be willing or able to put on the table as part of a nuclear deal. We also don’t know if he can sell any nuclear deal that we would accept to Iran’s supreme leader and the hard-liners back in Tehran. But he represents the best opportunity we have had to get a negotiated settlement to one of the most dangerous problems in the world today. If he makes us a decent offer, we should take it — and hope to build on it to deal with other problematic aspects of Iranian behavior like its support for terrorist groups. And we should try to move quickly because he needs to, not because we need to.
Kenneth M. Pollack is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the author most recently of Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb and American Strategy.
Iraqi Political Factions Divided
Over New Electoral Law
By: Mushreq Abbas for Al-Monitor Iraq Pulse Posted on October 13.
With the approach of every Iraqi election season, the country plunges into widespread controversy about the election law and about how it should be amended. The threats between the various political blocs escalate, with some hinting that they will boycott the election. These debates have typically ended by either returning to the previous law or by a political settlement that guarantees the interests of all the parties.
Iraqi political forces are squabbling while each tries to shape the new electoral law in a way that best suits its political clout.
The Iraqi Election Law… A Great Political Struggle… That Neglects the Rights of the Voter
Author: Mushreq Abbas
Posted on: October 13 2013
Translated by: Rani Geha
That scene happened during the past few weeks as Iraqi political forces tried to amend the law that would govern the 2014 parliamentary elections because there was not a fixed electoral law in Iraq, allowing parliament the right to change the law each electoral season or to amend earlier laws.
President of the Iraqi Kurdistan region Massoud Barzani said that the Kurdish parties might boycott the elections if their suggestions about the law were ignored. The Kurds have proposed to distribute the “compensatory seats” according to the voters’ proportions and to make Iraq a single voting district. The Kurds believe this will give them additional seats because of the increase in percentage of votes in Kurdish governorates compared to Arab ones.
The State of Law coalition, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, proposed using the 2010 law again because it does not guarantee the distribution of votes among the greatest winners, which the bloc benefited from in the 2010 elections when it received 89 seats of the 325 total in parliament.
Other blocs, such as the political current of Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, insist on using the provincial election law that was used for the provincial elections in April, which used the so-called Saint Lego method for calculating votes. These blocs feel that it serves the smaller forces, as proven by the elections last April when the Sadr movement, the Supreme Council and local forces successfully securing control of local governments, most significantly in Baghdad and Basra from the State of Law Coalition.
Other suggested amendments include granting parties the right to replace their deputies if they disobey party decisions. There’s also a debate about the minimum votes an electoral list needs to compete for the compensatory seats.
Al-Monitor received a copy of the electoral law and the clauses where there’s a disagreement from the parliamentary Legal Committee. The law consists of 44 articles, 10 of which are being debated. There are also five proposed articles to be added, and there are significant disagreements over those articles too.
A number of articles seem problematic and the differences around them are fundamental, namely these six points:
1. The method of calculating the votes in Article 14; there are three proposals for this, including one that calculates the votes according to the D’Hondt method and that the surplus votes be divided among the strongest winners. The second proposal is to calculate the votes according to the Saint Lego method, which distributes surplus seats to the strongest losers. The third proposal is to distribute the seats on the lists by subtracting the number of valid votes that each bloc receives.
2. There is a disagreement on Articles 11 and 15, which set the seat quotas for the minorities. The Kurds, along with other ethnic and religious minorities are demanding increasing the percentages allocated to minorities, whereby a new quota is given to the Yezidis, Shabak and Armenians, thus increasing the number of parliamentary seats to 340, 16 of which are for minorities. The Iraqiya, Sadrist, and other blocs prefer keeping the number of seats at 325. Most parties agree that each province be a single electoral district and that its number of seats be proportional with its population. But the Kurds disagree with that and want Iraq to be a single electoral district.
3. There is disagreement about how and where the votes are counted. Some want the electoral commission to open a number of centers to count the votes. Others want the votes counted at the polling stations, each of which will announce its results.
4. There is a dispute over the special voting for the security forces, the hospitals, and the prisons. Some propose that the special voting take place 48 hours before the elections, while others propose that it happen on the same day.
5. There is a dispute over a new article that sets the minimum of number of votes required for a list to have a parliamentary seat. Some want that number to be 1.5%, others 0.5%.
6. There is an article on which there seems to be an agreement because no one is proposing to amend it. That article stipulates that political blocs be given the right to replace deputies that do not meet the “electoral threshold,” but who have succeeded in reaching parliament via the votes obtained by their political blocs.
Regarding how the seats are distributed, Kurdish forces think that the voting participation rates in the Iraqi Kurdistan region are higher than in the rest of Iraq. So, they want to use that advantage by making Iraq a single electoral district, which would give the Kurds more seats. There is also a disagreement about how the votes are calculated and how to distribute the seats for which the vote threshold was not reached.
It is clear that the Iraqi forces are squabbling over the election law not because of differing philosophies about election laws in general or about how to protect the rights of voters and their voices.
Everybody agrees that a candidate must secure a certain number of votes to become a deputy. The dispute is because a large number seats go to candidates who have not met the voting threshold. Some haven’t even gotten 500 votes and yet managed to reach parliament by the votes obtained by their electoral bloc after other lists, whose candidates approached the threshold but didn’t meet it, were excluded.
That odd matter prompted the Federal Court in November 2012 to appeal the law according to which the 2013 provincial elections were held. That law was a carbon copy of the 2010 parliamentary election law before being amended to use the Saint Lego method in distributing the votes. The head of the Federal Court Medhat al-Mahmoud said that the “decision came in order to preserve the voters’ votes and to protect the general constitutional principles.”
The complex way the votes are calculated helps the major parties retain or increase their parliamentary shares by using the votes of smaller parties. Ten years after the “change” in Iraq and after four elections (two parliamentary and two local), the Iraqi political forces have not yet adopted less complex voting methods.
The core of the problem is apparently two-fold:
1. The insistence of the political forces on a system whereby each Iraqi province is an electoral district.
2. For the election to be for the benefit of a list in that district and one runoff candidate to be chosen from within that electoral list.
A new approach to the electoral law, some of the parties fear, might allow the rise of other parties and independent figures, which is considered a red line for the forces that dominate parliament. The Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish political monopolies consider the current division of power to be eternal.
I am saddened at not seeing any serious effort by the people and political parties in the different parts of Kurdistan to liberate many parts of our land. I remember in 1991 that the liberation of south (Iraqi) Kurdistan was the daily talk of every Kurd in Kurdistan and the world. Today, I do not see the same feeling about what is happening in western (Syrian) Kurdistan.
That part of Kurdish land is facing a serious battle and an unknown fate. The fact that the political groups in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan) are not taking advantage of this great opportunity is becoming clearer every day.
The Kurdistan Region can serve as a great lesson for the Kurdish parties in Syria. What they can learn is to maintain the semi-freedom they have gained, give it a legal status and win international support.
I would not say the parties in the Kurdistan Region have pursued a correct policy with regard to their own disputed territories with Iraq, which are no any less important than the Kurdish lands in Syria. But at least the Kurdish parties here practiced a healthy approach in turning their liberated areas from Iraq into an autonomous region and preserving its de facto status very early on. That is something that Kurdish parties in Syria can emulate today.
The Kurdistan Region can serve as a great lesson for the Kurdish parties in Syria. What they can learn is to maintain the semi-freedom they have gained, give it a legal status and win international support.
Following the liberation of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991 the Kurdistan Front back then ran military and government affairs jointly, while they all worked on holding general elections.
Back then Massoud Barzani, (now the president of the Kurdistan Region) said in the town of Koya that elections should be held and people should have a say in electing their government. Jalal Talabani, the head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) emphasized the same.
From that day on the idea of transforming the revolution into a civil and elected government became the talk of every party leader. That led to general elections in May 1992, and one way or another they established a government and parliament.
A few months later, the Kurdish leaders decided that relations between Kurdistan and Baghdad would be based on a federal system. Despite American obstacles, they insisted on their demand and made it the focal point in the meetings of Iraqi opposition groups in London and Salahaddin, right before the Iraq invasion in 2003.
An election, the establishment of a government, a regional legislature and giving the liberated areas an official status by the Kurds themselves turned the Kurdistan Region into an entity that the world recognized. Neighboring countries found themselves unable to destroy it, despite their ceaseless efforts.
The situation is very different now, compared to those days: Baghdad cannot oppose an autonomous Kurdistan Region in Syria; the Turkish foreign minister himself has said that his country is not against an autonomous Kurdish region, if that is what the people there want; Iran’s tone is soft; about the Syrian regime we need to say no more.
But unfortunately, there is neither a clear policy by the Kurdish groups there nor can we see an end to the rivalry between the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish Freedom Party (Azadi).
The world as a whole not only knows the Kurds better now, it in fact has greater appreciation for the Kurds.
Western Kurdistan is now living as a closed-off state, which will only stifle the little freedom that has been gained. Because of some ambiguous relations with Damascus and because of the powerlessness of the Supreme Kurdish Council, neither the Kurdish nation nor the world know what is going on there.
The Kurds in Syria have favorable regional and international factors to exploit for their own interests: The Kurds in Syria now have the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to lean on, they have the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in Turkey and the countries in the wider region are not against Kurdish rights like they were in 1991.
The world as a whole not only knows the Kurds better now, it in fact has greater appreciation for the Kurds.
But the single-minded polices of the PYD, which are opposed by people and other parties alike, stand in the way of Syrian Kurdistan gaining a democratic status and international recognition.
On the other hand, the other Kurdish parties have lost public trust to a degree that they are now called “the hotel parties” or “hotel leaders.” All their efforts are toward gaining support for their own parties, toward building relations with foreign countries without having a clear-cut plan for Syrian Kurdistan.
By not allowing the activities of other parties or the creation of a joint administration the PYD is killing the chance to liberate that part of Kurdistan. And the other Kurdish parties are ignoring the areas – and the populations -- that have been already liberated.
Like what happened in the Kurdistan Region two decades ago, the Syrian Kurdish parties must end their separate policies and work on establishing an elected administration.
That part of Kurdish land is facing a serious battle and an unknown fate.
However, because the ground has been completely shattered it must be rebuilt from scratch. All armed groups should be disbanded and replaced by a new united security force. All instructions should be reactivated under a joint administration, followed by elections.
The world does not care anymore where a revolution is taking place and which part of the world is liberated. What it wants to see is an area where democracy and freedom are practiced and elections take place.
All other Kurdish parties in other parts of Kurdistan should support and encourage Syrian Kurdish parties to unite, hold elections and create a free region, instead of playing them off against each other.
It is not clear whether the Syrian regime will survive or die. But the need to liberate the Kurdish areas should be clear, and that can only be done jointly and democratically.
- Ako Mohammed is director general of Rudaw Media Network
Maliki to visit Washington in Oct. 25
BAGHDAD / NINA / A source, close to Prime Minister Nuri al – Maliki, said: "Al-Maliki will visit Washington at October 25, at an official invitation from U.S. President Barack Obama."
The source told the National Iraqi News Agency / NINA / that al-Maliki will go to Washington on a head of large ministerial delegation on 25, Oct and will meet with U.S. President Barack Obama, to discuss the strategic framework agreement and bilateral relations."
The media adviser of Prime Minister, Ali al - Moussawi said earlier that "Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki plans to visit Washington in the coming period, in response to an official invitation of U.S. President Barack Obama."
Kuwait is trying to dominate the Iraqi economy
The future of Iraq / special
A source parliamentary prominent, on Sunday, attempts to Kuwait to control the Iraqi economy, particularly in the southern provinces by funding a team of companies and businessmen to be suppliers key to the local market, confirming the presence of pressures large in order to disable the law of customs tariff for a longer period. Said the source, who declined to be identified for »the future of Iraq» that «Kuwait is seeking to impose its hegemony on the Iraqi economy by paying its arms officials», indicating that it «has achieved great successes in this regard, especially since most of them invisible because of confusion happening in the political situation». source pointed out that «the lobby Kuwait presses toward the disabled law of customs tariff as much as possible, especially since the current parliament is witnessing the end of his legislative and إقباله to stage new election in an attempt to maintain control over a longer period on the Iraqi market, which is still not subject to standards and international standards with regard to import and export ».
The government agreed recently on a bill to postpone the application of tariff law until the check conditions applied after that and finished the House of Representatives earlier in the first reading of the draft law on second amendment to the tariff law No. (22) for the year 2010, submitted by the Committees of Finance and Economy and investment in order to provide the technical requirements to implement the provisions of tariff law and maintain the price level in the Iraqi market at the present time and protect consumers from price increase expected result of implementing the Act and to provide the Ministry of Finance for the reasons and justifications practical and artistic to postpone its application. Iraq was imposed fees كمركية on goods before the year 2003, according to Law 77 of 1955 He stopped after that with the entry of American troops to Iraq to issue a civil governor in Iraq Bremer charge worth 5 percent on goods entering Iraq, known then charges the reconstruction of Iraq.
Iraqi accepted on shopping over the internet due to the presence of sites offering great facilities for buyers Mnhaaissal the purchases to homes, and the granting of customer discounts, and other features.
And became Sites such as Amazon and other unpopular and wide in Iraqi cities, because they allow people to see through which the goods displayed and compare it with what is available in the markets.
It is believed owned by Yasser Hussein, one of the beneficiaries of online shopping that this type of shopping is useful and fun at the same time.
As Mrs. Nada Ahmed Vtatkd, electronic shopping, despite its importance, but it does not provide all the requirements. She says it would prefer to see the neighborhood on what you intend to buy from the market to choose the best especially household items and kitchenware.
However turnout electronic shopping-winning initiated by the owners of commercial premises to set up their sites on the Internet to display their wares and promote services that submit them to customers, including import Maergb customer purchased from global brand sites.
Said Ahmed Salim, a shopkeeper in Baghdad, said the electronic services provided by its customers has become an important source of income, since the material that sells online is more than those that sell directly.
Dergham economist Muhammad Ali believes that the vogue electronic shopping phenomenon good for the Iraqi economy because it provides an opportunity to activate the work of banks using electronic systems and opens new horizons for the Iraqi market.
Mr. Ammar al-Hakim called on Chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of the United States to attend the largest in Iraq at the economic level and contribute to their companies in the reconstruction of Iraq,
Indicating the importance of this audience and that its role is not restricted to the political side only. A statement issued by the office of Mr. Ammar al-Hakim, said that "Mr. Hakim received yesterday the first U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Robert Stephen Beecroft." He added that "the two sides discussed the latest developments in Iraq and the region, calling for His Eminence to the adoption of dialogue a way to solve problems and crises, noting the need to hold elections on schedule." The statement continued, "For his part, praised the U.S. ambassador to the efforts of Mr. Hakim and his moderate who seeks through it to plural of Iraqi political forces to build Iraq. "