World Bank Trust Fund IRAQ
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  1. #1
    RED LILY
    Guest

    World Bank Trust Fund IRAQ

    World Bank Iraq Trust Fund

    First Capacity Building Project (TF053196)

    October 2011

    Project Summary Sheet

    Title: First Capacity Building Project (Completed)

    Implementing Agency Location:: World Bank, N/A – Institutional Support

    15110 Economic and development policy / planning

    COMPACT PRIORITY: 4.2.3.1 Adopt and implement policies, legislation, regulations, procedures and build institutions of public service management

    Project Cost: Project Cost US$3.6 million

    DURATION: 6 MONTHS

    APPROVAL DATE: January 2004 Effective Date February 2004 Closing Date August 2004

    PROJECT DESCRIPTION: The Project aimed to build the capacity of the Iraqi authorities to enable them to define, prioritize, and implement international programs of support, and to play a leading role in the reconstruction process.

    BENEFICIARIES: The Project focused on the immediate need for Iraqi ministries to upgrade Project planning and management skills. More than 580 officials from various ministries and local institutions benefitted from the Project.

    Strategic Context and Donor Coordination

    The Project aimed to build the capacity of the Iraqi authorities to enable them to participate in the definition, prioritization, and implementation of international support, and to play a lead role in the reconstruction process. The Project was designed to respond to the immediate and most urgent training needs of the Iraqi public sector staff. The specific activities undertaken were agreed upon by the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and the various ministries concerned, and focused on priority areas for Iraq’s development agenda and the preparation and implementation of the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund-financed projects. The European Commission’s Rapid Response Mechanism (EC-RRM) provided €3 million for a six-month implementation period, with no extension of the closing date.

    Project Development Objective

    • Assist Iraqi officials to design and implement projects and start developing sector strategies

    • Develop professional networks between Iraqi officials and counterparts in other ministries and neighboring countries

    Outputs, Key Activities and Procurement

    OUTPUTS:

    • Workshops and training for key staff from relevant agencies (581 staff from 19 ministries)

    ACTIVITIES:

    • Training on managing the project cycle (procurement, financial management, project management, and safeguards)
    • Sector-specific training for line ministries
    • Training for private sector capacity enhancement

    Procurement: N/A


    Qualitative Assessment of Project Performance

    Representatives from the Central Bank, the Mayoralty of Baghdad, the Board of Supreme Audit, universities, private banks, Chambers of Commerce and Business Associations participated in workshops and training in three areas: (i) Managing the project cycle, including procurement, financial management; (ii) Strategic and technical skills in education, health, and infrastructure sectors; and (iii) Enhance private sector capacity to support sustainable growth and job creations. The program enabled the Iraqi officials to design and implement projects and start developing sector strategies towards longer-term development.

    Iraqi officials develop professional networks with counterparts in other ministries and neighboring countries.

    Major Implementation Obstacles

    N/A – The Project is completed and closed.


    PDF: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/Resources/PSSITFCapacityIOctober2011.pdf


    What is their continuing role there?


    Last edited by RED LILY; 06-07-2013 at 02:00 AM.



  2. #2
    RED LILY
    Guest
    Interim Strategy Note for Iraq
    The Interim Strategy Note (ISN) outlines the World Bank's approach to assist Iraq with its development program over the period FY09-11. The objective of the ISN is to help the Iraqi Government use its own resources more effectively to support private sector-led growth and deliver basic services. The Strategy's three themes are: (i) Continuing to support ongoing reconstruction and socio-economic recovery; (ii) Improving management of public resources, human, natural, and financial; and (iii) Supporting policies and institutions that promote broad-based, private-sector-led growth. It further paves the way for involvement of IFC and MIGA in support of private sector development over FY09-11

    http://documents.worldbank.org/curat...-mid-fyo9-fy11

    Iraq - Interim strategy note for the period mid FYO9-FY11 (English)

    Iraq has made important progress towards political and economic stabilization, although the situation remains fragile and reversible. Recent months have seen a sharp decline in incidents of violence, especially in the Baghdad area, and a corresponding decrease in the rate of internal displacement of the population. This reflects improved security as well as successful initial steps towards political reconciliation. Macroeconomic performance has also improved although growth has been volatile. The Government has been demonstrating its commitment to reform and reconstruction, indicating that continued engagement with Iraq may produce further concrete results. The Government has succeeded in sharply reducing inflation and containing recurrent spending, while increasing capital expenditures to accelerate the recovery process. The Interim Strategy Note (ISN) also benefited from extensive consultations with the Government of Iraq, the donor community, and other stakeholders, including representatives from private sector and civil society organizations. These consultations were helpful in identifying the country priorities, defining promising engagement arrangements to maximize Bank assistance results, and highlighting the centrality of donor coordination. Some of the main priority areas identified during the consultations include: (i) public financial management; (ii) banking sector reform; (iii) support to planning processes and strategy design (not only at the central level, but also at the sectoral and provincial levels); (iv) private sector development; and (v) energy and services

    DETAILS

    • Document Date2009/02/19
    • Document TypeInterim Strategy Note
    • Report Number47304
    • Volume No1 of 1
    • CountryIraq;
    • RegionMiddle East and North Africa;
    • Disclosure Date2009/03/23
    • Doc NameIraq - Interim strategy note for the period mid FYO9-FY11

    See More +

    DOWNLOADS

    COMPLETE REPORT IN ENGLISH

    Official version of document (may contain signatures, etc)
    *The text version is uncorrected OCR text and is included solely to benefit users with slow connectivity.


    CITATION

    World Bank. 2009. Iraq - Interim strategy note for the period mid FYO9-FY11. Washington D.C. - The Worldbank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curat...-mid-fyo9-fy11



  3. #3
    RED LILY
    Guest
    PDF: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/externa...0Use0Only1.pdf

    INTERIM STRATEGY NOTE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ FOR THE PERIOD MID FY09-FY11


    A. The World Bank’s Engagement with Iraq

    29. Iraq has a long history of engagement with the Bank Group. Iraq was a founding member of the World Bank and IFC, and received six loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) between 1950 and 1973 for agriculture, education, flood control, telecommunications, and transport. The last loan closed in 1979.

    The World Bank Group re-engaged with Iraq in the summer o f 2003 when it prepared a needs assessment together with the United Nations (UN).

    The UN-World Bank Joint Needs Assessment was the basis for the October 2003 International Conference on Iraq in Madrid.

    The International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI)
    was endorsed at the Madrid Conference, in response to international requests for donors to channel their resources and coordinate their support for reconstruction and development activities in Iraq.

    In close consultation with Iraqi authorities and donors, the World Bank and UN created the structure, governance, and modalities o f IRFFI. The IRFFI structure i s designed to ensure that activities financed by the Facility are aligned with Iraq’s priorities.

    IRFFI encompasses two trust funds: the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund (ITF) administered by the World Bank, and the UN Development Group Trust Fund (UNDG Trust Fund) administered by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on behalf o f itself and participating UN organizations. The World Bank Board o f Executive Directors approved the World Bank to act as Administrator o f the ITF in January 2004.9

    30. World Bank Group support to Iraq since 2003 has been framed around two Interim Strategy Notes. The first ISN (FY04-05) for Iraq was presented to the Board o f Executive Directors in January 2004. It built on the Bank’s work in 2003, including the preparation of Watching Briefs in key sectors as well as on the joint Needs Assessment undertaken in collaboration with the UN. It was designed to rely on the Bank’s Iraq Trust Fund to finance emergency projects.

    Activities under the first ISN were organized under three tracks: (i) Build Iraqi institutional capacity; (ii) prepare and start implementing emergency operations to address urgent needs; and (iii)la y the groundwork for Iraq’s medium-term reconstruction and development program.


    31. The second ISN (FYO6-07) was discussed by the Board of Executive Directors in September 2005. It provided the framework for up to US$500 million from IDA as well as additional resources from the Iraq Trust Fund. Under the overall umbrella of institution building, the second ISN was organized around four pillars: (i)re store basic service delivery; (ii)e nable private sector development; (iii)s trengthen social safety nets; and (iv) improve public sector governance.

    32. The Bank has approved since 2003 a total of US$990.1 million in financing for Iraq: US$481.6 million in grants from the World Bank Iraq Trust Fund and US$508.5 million in soft loans from IDA. Both the first and second ISNs envisaged possible IBRD support (in the order o f US$500 million), which did not materialize in view o f Iraq’s limited absorptive capacity.


    33. Since the inception of IFC’s work in Iraq in 2003, the Corporation has undertaken a range of investment and technical assistance activities.

    The primary focus o f the program has been to support for the financial sector, the construction sector, and SMEs. IFC committed US$115 million in 3 projects since 2003. IFC has 10 percent stake in Credit Bank (US$5 million), provided US$12 million loan to Iraq National Bank (INB) to support SME lending, and committed US$99 million to support the construction o f the first private cement company in Suleimanya, Kurdistan.

    Last edited by RED LILY; 06-04-2013 at 04:12 AM.

  4. #4
    RED LILY
    Guest


    THESE PDF'S ARE HARD TO COPY OVER. I APOLOGIZE FOR ANY FORMATTING THAT MAY APPEAR. I AM TO TWEAKING THIS.



    SAME PDF: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/externa...0Use0Only1.pdf

    10. Important challenges remain for the reconciliation process in Iraq.

    Chief among those are:

    (a) the type of federal system to be adopted in Iraq;

    (b) the degree ofdevolution of powers to the regions;

    ERBIL AGREEMENT!! NOW REMEMBER, THIS IS THE WORLD BANK TALKING HERE.. THEY ARE MORE INVOLVED THEN ONE MAY THINK. WE see the word BANK and it throws us off.. - "Devolution of POWERS", sharing of leadership!! NOT IMPLEMENTED YET AS IT RELATES TO THE MINISTERS.~ RED LILY ~ 5-29-13

    (c) the status o f Kirkuk and other disputed internal boundaries;

    ARTICLE 140 - Disputed territories ~ RED LILY ~

    (d) the modalities and mechanisms of oil revenue management, particularly in view of (a)-(c) above 4;

    (d) the nature of the political system, particularly with respect to the potential for further sectarian polarization; and

    HERE WE SEE THEY WATCH THE POLITICAL SITUATION AS WELL. ~ RED LILY ~

    (e) Iraq’s place in the broader geopolitical context, in light of the Status of Forces Agreement, and its evolving relationships with neighboring countries.

    THERE IS THE "SOFA" AGREEMENT ~ RED LILY ~

    4Contention on the Hydrocarbon Law (HCL) revolves around the extent of foreign participation in the oil sector.

    Some favor a regional sharing of responsibilities while others prefer a national oil investment and productionframework which would allow oversight of foreign investment.

    B. Implementation of Economic Reforms: 2003-2008


    ECONOMIC REFORM ACTS HAVE BEEN ALL OVER THE NEWS RECENTLY. THEY STILL HAVE NOT PASSED THE BANKING AND TARIFF LAWS NEEDED TO FULFILL OBLIGATIONS TO THE IMF AND WTO.. ~ RED LILY ~

    1 1. In the early post-war years, attempts were made to implement reforms similar to the “shock therapy” programs of the mid-90s in some transition economies of Eastern Europe.

    The main thrust of the reforms revolved around the assumption thatmarket-friendly reforms and the creation of appropriate legal and regulatory arrangementsto facilitate private investment would lead to reconstruction and growth.


    TARIFFS!! ~ RED LILY ~ 5-29-13

    Reforms were oriented towards creating an attractive investment climate forforeign investors and a neweconomy.

    Foreign investors would be allowed 100 percent ownership of Iraqi assets,repatriation of profits and equal legal standing with local firms, except in the oil productionand refining sectors.

    Foreign banks were permitted to establish operations and purchase equity shares in existing Iraqi financial institutions.

    Income and corporate taxes were capped at 15 percent.

    Tariffs were reduced to a universal 5 percent with none on food, drugs, books and other humanitarian imports. Iraq’s State-Owned Enterprises, except for those in the oil sector, were to be privatized.

    THE TARIFFS THEY HAVE NOW ARE NOT CONDUCIVE TO TODAYS GLOBAL PROCEDURES AND MUST BE AMENDED FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH ~ RED LILY ~ 6-3-13

    12. Some of these reform efforts were premature for Iraq and lacked domestic ownership, often leading to disappointing results.


    Onlyrelatively fewof the policy reforms implemented in Iraq in the early postwar years were tailored to the local context.[/U]

    These reforms were at times ill-informed and revealed a lack of appreciation of local context and needs.

    HENCE THE NEED FOR AMENDMENTS TO OR NEW TARIFF LAWS ~ RED LILY ~ 5-29-13

    This disconnect was exacerbated by the massive brain drain that occurred during the period.

    Local capacity was unavailable and sometimes inadequate.

    The Iraqi economy, particularly in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, had suffered from high inflation, capital consumption and rapidly falling living standards.

    HIGH INFLATION THAT SHABIBI HELPED TAME.. ~ RED LILY ~ 6-3-13


    Iraq’s institutions were also shaped by 30 years of authoritarian legacy, decades of sanctions, war and dictatorship where rent seeking and patronage reigned and oil provided the state with a tool to garner public compliance.

    The state provided Iraqis with free services and utilities such as gas, electricity and water.

    COULD YOU IMAGINE LIVING IN A COUNTRY WHERE YOUR ELECTRICITY WAS FREE? WHAT DOES YOUR ELECTRIC BILL LOOK LIKE RIGHT NOW THANKS TO OUR OWN GOVERNMENT?? ~ RED LILY ~ 6-3-13

    Most prices were controlled, many consumer goods and foodstuffs rationed, and the money and banking system was developed to finance the state apparatus.

    13. Nonetheless, significant progress was achieved during the past few years withthe support of the international financial organizations.

    Under themonitoring of three consecutive IMF programs, the Government succeeded in drastically improving macroeconomic performance. Growth is projected to increase from 1.5 percent (2007) to 9.8 percent (2008).

    MONITORING OF 3 CONSECUTIVE IMF PROGRAMS. I remember a friend of mine sending me a post from some GURU saying THIS IS THE GREEN LIGHT TO RV THEIR CURRENCY... FOLKS, YOU read it and tell me what you think. It is unreal what people will do to fool you.. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS MONITORING WAS THE RECENT ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION WE SAW RECENTLY HERE:

    http://www.dinarupdates.com/showthread.php?12103-PLEASE-READ-IMF-Executive-Board-Concludes-2013-Article-IV-Consultation-with-Iraq



    Authorities managed to curb inflationary pressures and reducedollarization of the economy.

    REDUCE THE 'DOLLARIZATION' OF THE COUNTRY. We have been seeing in recent articles where the DOLLAR is in circulation so much that the value of the DINAR is decreasing. WE NEED TO SEE THIS REDUCTION AGAIN. They really need SHABIBI ~ RED LILY ~ 6-3-13

    The Government's record demonstrates its commitment to fiscal sustainability and sound macroeconomic policies. As such, direct budgetary fuel subsidies were eliminated by 2008 except for a small subsidy on kerosene, which will be abolished in 2009.

    With the support of the IMF and the World Bank, progress instrengthening budget management and banking sector reform is underway5. With supportfrom the IMF, the Government also executed a debt restructuring program with all ParisClub creditors which should be completed by December 2008.

    NOW THIS REPORT IS FROM YEARS AGO. NOTICE THIS QUOTE, "With the support of the IMF and the World Bank, progress instrengthening budget management and banking sector reform is underway"... YET HERE WE ARE... YEARS LATER. ~ RED LILY ~ 6-3-13


    Non- Paris Club restructuring is still on-going. However, a trade-off remains between curbing spending to maintain financial discipline with the need for public sector investments and job creation.



    15: The monetary and exchange rate policy stance has helped contain inflation and reduce dollarization in the economy. Between 2003 and 2007 capital inflows, supply bottlenecks and conflicts had accelerated inflation. Consumer price inflation jumped to 65 percent in 2006. By end-2007, inflation was brought down to 5 percent. Inflation has been capped with a monetary fiscal policy mix. Since November 2006, the CBI had allowed a gradualappreciation of the ID against the dollar and raised its policy interest rate to 20 percent as of January 2007.

    Between end-2007 and July 2008, the CBI lowered its policy rate in three steps from 20 percent to 16 percent. The CBI policy interest rate has been reduced to 15 percent as of November 3, 2008. As inflationary pressures get contained, further easing of monetary policy through the policy interest rate would be conducive to better functioning o f the banking sector. Accumulation of gross international reserves reached US$40 billion at end July 2008 (equivalent to about 11 months of imports of goods and services).

    16. Iraq’s fiscal position remained strong while oil prices were on the rise. Fiscal surpluses were achieved for four consecutive years. Rising oil revenues and a low rate of execution o f the capital budget strengthened the fiscal position.

    The balance in theDevelopment Fund for Iraq (DFI) reached US$23.5 billion by end September 2008, an 85 percent increase from end-2007. Direct budgetary fuel subsidies were eliminated in 2008 except for a small subsidy on kerosene. These had amounted to 13 percent o f GDP in 20046. The overall budget surplus reached 13.5 percent of GDP in 2007.

    Rising output in 2008 has allowed the COR to boost this year’s budget in a supplementary spending bill approved earlier in August. The supplementary budget includes significant increases in current and capital spending in priority sectors while preserving fiscal sustainability. The inflationary impact o f this fiscal stimulus is expected to be modest. A preliminary overall surplus for 2008 is estimated at about 8 percent despite the recent downturn in world oil prices and the supplementary budget. In addition, capital spending has increased two-fold from 2007 levels but is still below budget.

    18. Iraq’s debt restructuring has made substantive progress. With the third and laststage of Paris Club debt reduction that went into effect in December 2008, Iraq has restructured its external debt with all of its eighteen Paris Club creditors. Debt agreements have also been concluded with 11 non-Paris Club creditors. Negotiations are ongoing with the remainder.

    In July, the United Arab Emirates announced full cancellation o f Iraq’s outstanding debt Most of Iraq’s commercial debt was successfully renegotiated over 2004-2006, leaving Iraq with an outstanding debt of US $5.2 billion by end-2007 (down from US$21.9 billion). [B]The old debt was swapped (with an 80 percent discount) into a 20-year bond. By end-2007, Iraq’s total external debt amounted to US$103 billion, or about 165 percent o f GDP.

    The debt-to-GDP ratio could be reduced to a third of that figure in 2009 if agreements with all non Paris Club creditors were completed along terms similar to the 2004 agreement with Paris club creditor^.^ [COLOR=#ff0000]Based on the Paris Club Agreement, Iraqwill start making repayments on the remainder o f the debt stock by 2011.

    However, the recent slump in world oil prices has increased Iraq’s external vulnerability given the country’s dependence on oil exports.

    Box 2: How the World Bank Group Works in Iraq

    Iraqi Staff Konsultants throughout Iraq. The World Bank has had a continuous presence in Iraq since mid-2004,employing several professional-level Iraqis. Several national staff and consultants work out of their homes (usingsatellite phone and email connections) and in the executing agencies to support the implementation of projects. Their access to the former “Green Zone” was constrained due to security risks and complex clearance procedures at check points to enter that Zone. In the KRG, however, staff and consultants were able to function normally, attending meetings and visiting project sites as needed.

    International Staff in Baghdad. International staff based in a secured area in Baghdad focus on overall policydialogue and donor coordination and are playing an increasing role in portfolio oversight. From mid-2004 to mid-2007, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) facilitated an expatriate consultant based in the former “Green Zone” to serve as a liaison for the World Bank with the Iraqi Government and donors. In 2007, that role was expanded to that of a Country Manager for Iraq. The World Bank hired a new Country Manager and a new public sector specialist both located in Baghdad as of the last quarter of 2008. In addition, a DfI D-funded private sector development specialist and a senior operations officer are being recruited to further strengthen the Country Office’s capabilities. Bank staff in Baghdad are supported by a projects assistant and support staff. IFC staff visited Iraq to conduct field appraisal of one project

    Interim Office for Iraq in Amman. The Amman Office was established in 2003, after the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad, which also housed the Bank‘s office, which killed one Bank consultant and injured several staff. The Amman Office provides key logistical support for Bank staff and consultants located in Iraq and for visiting missions, including support for staff travel, security, and medical emergencies, in addition to administrative support to the Iraq program, it also provides a cost-effective and secure venue to hold meetings and workshops that require large teams to work closely over several days, as is required for appraisal, negotiations, and supervision missions. .

    The IFC Jordan Office in Amman. The office i s responsible for covering IFC’s programs in Jordan and Iraq and is co-located with the World Bank’s Interim Office for Iraq. The office allowed for improved communication with Iraqi government counterparts and the private sector community. Many major Iraqi businessmen and private sector companies are located in Jordan. It has also allowed for better coordination with the donor community, and improved coordination with the World Bank.

    Fiduciary Monitoring Agent (FMA). The Bank employs an Iraqi firm in Baghdad, to help ensure that funds aredisbursed only for the purposes intended and according to applicable World Bank procedures. The FMA employs about two dozen Iraqi staff, predominantly professional engineers and accountants, who visit project sites and ministries on a daily basis. The FMA reports its findings to the World Bank task team and the Project Management Teams in the implementing agencies.

    Videoconferencing (VC) Facilities. In 2004, the World Bank installed four video-conferencing facilities in Baghdad (located in the Convention Center in the former Green Zone, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance, and Central Bank of Iraq). The VC hub at the convention center was dismantled without warning in mid-2006 by Iraqi officials.

    The World Bank procured and installed portable VC equipment in the World Bank office

    38. The World Bank also engages a local Iraqi firm as a Fiduciary Monitoring Agent (FMA) to help supervise project implementation. The FMA assists PMTs in building their capacity in project management, visits project sites and supports the PMTs to monitor the physical implementation of projects and the implementing agency’s compliance with the required procurement and financial management procedures. The FMA reports issues to the World Bank’s task teams as they arise, to ensure the teams can follow up on any implementation concerns.

    The FMA’s monthly reports describe and document the physical progress o f projects, report key findings, and make recommendations for follow-up actions to be carried out by the PMT and World Bank task team. Reports include digital photos, which provide evidence of the delivery o f goods, and assess the quality and progress o f the work o f contractors. Staff o f the FMA also participated in supervision missions, working closely with the task team and PMT to improve project implementation. The FMA performance is evaluated each year by the Bank.









    Last edited by RED LILY; 06-04-2013 at 04:16 AM.

  5. #5
    RED LILY
    Guest
    Please read post 4 especially.

  6. #6
    RED LILY
    Guest
    THANKS CHATTELS~~

    World Bank Iraq Trust Fund


    Banking Sector Reform Project (TF094193/P113337)
    September 2010


    Project Summary Sheet


    Title Banking Sector Reform Project


    Implementing
    Agency


    Central Bank of Iraq (CBI)


    Location N/A – Institutional Support/Nationwide


    Sector code


    (OECD DAC)


    24010 Financial Policy and Administrative Management


    24020 Monetary Institutions


    Compact Priority


    4.3.3.1 Undertake specific measures to restructuring State-Owned Banks


    4.3.3.2 Undertake specific measures to promote private banking


    Project Cost US$10 million


    Duration 50 months


    Approval Date April 2009 Effective Date April 2009 Closing Date June 30, 2013


    Project
    Description


    The project aims to support the Iraqi authorities in the implementation of Phase I of the “Iraq Banking Reform Strategy” (2008-2012) and its Action Plan, focusing on four main components:

    (i) institutional and operational restructuring of the two state-owned

    commercial banks;
    (ii) financial restructuring of the two state-owned commercial banks;

    (iii) strengthening the regulatory and supervisory functions of the Central Bank of Iraq;
    and
    (iv) project management, monitoring and evaluation.


    Beneficiaries


    The project supports the Iraqi government to build a sound banking system, able to provide efficient financial services competitively. The immediate direct beneficiaries would be the two largest state-owned commercial banks—Rafidain Bank and Rasheed Bank—which account for more than 70 percent of the banking system. Ultimately, all Iraqi businesses and citizens will benefit from an improved banking system that can provide the resources needed for Iraq’s growth and offer good deposit and payment systems for businesses and households.


    Near Term
    Employment
    Creation
    N/A


    Strategic Context and Donor Coordination


    The donor community has been active in helping Iraq in restructuring the banking sector. The World Bank has been coordinating with all development partners involved in the banking reform, including the IMF, EU, US Treasury, and Financial Services Volunteer Corps (FSVC).

    The IMF has taken the lead in
    monetary activities and rebuilding the capacity of CBI.

    The US has focused mainly on the restructuring and
    financial audits of the state-owned banks, and helping Iraq draft an operational restructuring plan.

    FSVC
    provides technical assistance to CBI to strengthen its internal operations. The World Bank chairs an “Iraq Banking Reform Donors Group”, to coordinate efforts, promote complementarity, and avoid overlap.

    THERE IT IS FOLKS.. THE "POWERS THAT BE (PTB)".. IMO THESE ARE THE PEOPLE WHO WILL GIVE IRAQ THE "GREENLIGHT" TO REVALUE THEIR CURRENCY.. THEY ARE THE ONES STUDYING NOT ONLY THE BANKING SECTOR, BUT THE ECONOMIC SECTOR AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAQ.. ~~RED LILY


    Project Development Objective


    • Support Iraq’s implementation of Phase I of the Iraq Banking Sector Reform Strategy

    • Strengthen the supervisory framework for financial intermediation

    Outputs, Key Activities and Procurement


    Outputs


    • New organizational structures for the two state-owned banks are adopted

    • Number of staff trained in each bank would reach at least 100 staff members

    • Compliance supervisory and regulatory framework (Basle Code Principles)



    Activities •


    Procurement


    Goods: US$0.35 million


    Consultants’ Services and Training: US$8.90million


    Incremental Operating Expenses: US$0.25 million


    Unallocated: US$0.50 million



    Financial Data


    Funds Committed US$1.3 million % approved 13


    Funds Disbursed US$0.4 million % approved 4


    Forecast Closing Date June 2013



    Delay


    (months)


    Progress against Indicators


    Improvement in functioning of the two state-owned commercial banks, evident in the increase in loan-to-GDP ratios from 4% in June 2006 to 6% in October 2010.


    Loan-to-GDP ratios increased to reach 5% in 2009 % of planned

    WE WANT THE LOAN TO GDP RATIO TO GO DOWN IMO. THEIR MONEY WOULD BE WORTH MORE... ??. ~~RED LILY



    Build-up in provision levels at the two state-owned commercial banks for new loans, reflected in the reserves-to-NPLs ratios, rising from 10% in June 2006 to 20% in October 2010.


    The reserves-to-NPL ratios raised from 10% in June 2006 to reach 15% in 2009 Capital adequacy ratio in line with prudential regulations, Reaching up to 4% by October 2010.


    Capital adequacy ratio reached 2% in 2009

    Number of staff trained to do bank operation


    Number of staff trained to do bank operations reached 4 in 2009


    http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IRFFI/Resources/BankingSep2010.pdf
    Last edited by RED LILY; 06-07-2013 at 12:06 AM.

  7. #7
    RED LILY
    Guest
    Educate yourself on this. It puts things in a better perspective and LORD knows it is confusing enough. ~ RED LILY ~

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