United States Institute of Peace
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Iraq Experience Project


HUGH TANT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Interviewed by: Mark Gribbin
Initial interview date: October 22, 2004
Copyright 2004 ADST

Brigadier General Hugh Tant, retired, is a career army officer who has extensive experience in financial management. Most recently, he spent five-an-a-half years in charge of two-thirds ($44 billion) of the Army's budget. He volunteered to lead the currency exchange program in Iraq. He was stationed in Iraq from September 2003 to January 2004. The currency exchange program ran from October 15 2003 to January 15 2003.
Currency exchange was necessary for five reasons; (1) two currencies were in circulation, the old Swiss dinar in the north and the Saddam dinar in the rest of the country; (2) inadequate numbers of denominations existed, the Swiss dinar came in 3 denominations and the Saddam came in only two denominations; (3) the currency was poorly made and easily counterfeited; (4) the Saddam dinar had been devalued and the public had little trust in it; (5) the presence of Saddam on the currency was inappropriate.

Tant details the logistical challenges his team faced, including (1) redesigning the currency; (2) printing new bills; (3) transporting new currency into Iraq and around the country; (4) public awareness initiatives to inform the public of the exchange program; (5) the physical exchange of currency conducted at hundreds of banks nationwide (old Saddam and Swiss dinars for new dinars); (6) counterfeit spotting; (7) accountability mechanisms; and (8) disposal of old currency.

Tant’s team worked closely with the Central Bank of Iraq, who staffed and ran all operations except for transport and security. Central Bank staff rode along in convoys, signed for exchanges of old and new currency, oversaw exchanges, ran accountability checks, and supervised disposal. Staff at local banks actually conducted currency exchanges.

Security for the program was provided by several sources. Tant’s team had a 700-man security detail on contract from Global Risk Strategies. This force was responsible for protecting the convoys that carried new currency to (and old currency from) the 243 banks involved in the exchange. As needed, the coalition
military provided additional support for the convoys. Banks were protected by coalition and contract security during the exchanges and by indigenous Iraqi forces at night.

Security was an issue during the exchange, with most difficulties encountered in the Sunni Triangle. There were also a few problems in Najaf, but these were not major. The flexibility of the exchange operation allowed for the program to avoid flare-ups of violence. Tant’s rank and connections allowed him all the support he needed. He comments on the high quality of his contract forces, the coalition military, the CPA (especially Ambassador Bremer), and the Iraqi Central Bank leadership and staff. His one complaint was that the contractor for “life support” (food, lodgings, etc.) did a poor job.

United States Institute of Peace
Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
Iraq Experience Project

HUGH TANT
Interviewed by: Mark Gribbin
Initial interview date: October 22, 2004
Copyright 2004 ADST

Q: Today is October the 22nd. This is Mark Gribbin. This is an interview with Brigadier General Hugh Tant. General Tant, to start off, could tell me a little bit about your background, your experience that led you on the road to Iraq?
TANT: My name's Hugh TANT, and I spent over 30 years in the United States Army after graduating from the Citadel Military College of South Carolina, and served in various positions, including the Airborne Infantry and in many financial management positions, culminating in serving in the Pentagon my last 5.5 years, where I was in charge of two-thirds of the Army's budget, about $44 billion. I briefed the Hill – the staffers and congressmen – about our justification of the budget and requirements for the budget. I also provided review and analysis of the budget. This was necessary to ensure that our army was funded to the level necessary to ensure success on the battlefield and to win our nation's wars. That was the kind of money that I was responsible for – the Army’s operation and maintenance appropriation. We use that money to train and recruit the troops, to fix our equipment, repair our buildings, and essentially make sure the troops are ready to go to war.

After holding that position, I retired on the 1st of October, 2001and returned to my home area of Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, where I became a banker. And about four months after I was a banker, I got the call to volunteer in Iraq.

Q: When did you go to Iraq?
TANT: I went to Iraq on 9/11, 2003. I came home January20-something, 2004. The purpose of me going there was to serve as the director of the Iraqi Currency Exchange. Ambassador Bremer needed a person with leadership skills to change out the currency in Iraq, someone who knew how to get things done with large amounts of money. So I served as the director of the Iraqi currency exchange, working closely with
the Central Bank of Iraq, and I had about 700 former soldiers that reported to me, and we conducted the mission.

Q: When you arrived on the ground, what sort of shape was the Central Bank in? I understand that under the previous regime, it was just riddled with corruption.
TANT: Well, during the war, most of the banks in Iraq were broken into and robbed by the population there, and destroyed, as was the Central Bank of Iraq. They even took RPGs and tried to fire and break into the vaults down there. Of course I understand that some of the culprits who tried to do that lost their lives.

Q: Poetic justice.
TANT: They were in too close to the proximity of the explosion. Of course, there was flooding in the Central Bank of Iraq, and it was just a total mess. They had some pretty good leaders there. Ahmed Mohammad al-Jabouri, who is the deputy, as well as Haji Fallah, who was another deputy governor of the Central Bank of Iraq. They were the two deputies. They essentially worked for Sinan al-Shabibi, who is the governor of the Central Bank of Iraq. He was newly designated in that position. He and the other two fellows had worked there for some time – really good people. Under their leadership, things started happening, improvements were made for the Central Bank of Iraq, and it became functional.

Q: What was the nature of the Iraqi banking system? Did the Central Bank have branches throughout the country? Could you explain how the banking system worked?
TANT: You had the Central Bank which answered, of course, to Saddam. And whenever he directed, they had to print more money, which was a negative inflationary monetary policy. That was one of the reasons why the currency had to be replaced. There were banks – to get back specifically to your question – there were banks throughout Iraq. Rafidain and Rashid, they owned and operated several hundred state banks. Their headquarters were collocated on the same compound in Baghdad where the Central Bank of Iraq is located. This allowed for very close coordination. But they owned/operated some 80, 90 percent of the banks throughout Iraq. Then there were some private banks that had branches throughout Iraq as well.

Q: What exactly were Rafidain and Rashid?
TANT: They were the two state banks. Most of the banks – a great, great majority of the banks – fell under their control.

Q: How strong were the state banks' ties to the regime?
TANT: I imagine they were very strongly tied to the regime. They were at the beck and call of Saddam and did anything the regime demanded. They had to. As a result of that, the currency was just devalued in an enormous way. We found that they had two currencies over there, and when you're trying to unify a country, you need to have one currency. That was another one of the reasons why we had to change out the currency.

Q: They had two currencies?
TANT: Yes. The original currency of the country was called the Swiss dinar. The Kurdish area up in the north is where they used that: north of the no-fly zone line. They mainly continued to operate in the Swiss dinar, the original currency. That currency was not replaced, recycled, if you will, and it had a lot more value than the Saddam dinar. There were some negotiations that went on about how to exchange this currency, and at what rate, for the new dinar. The rate ended up being 150 to one. In other words, in the
Kurdish area, when they turned in Swiss dinars to one of the operating banks used during the exchange (and there were about 243 banks used during the exchange), they would get 150 of the new dinar for one of the Swiss dinar. The Swiss dinar basically had three denominations. But, in the great majority of the country, they had the Saddam dinar with Saddam's face on it. There were basically only two denominations of that: there was a 10,000-dinar note, which was worth about $5, and there was a 250-dinar note, which was worth about 12.5 cents, 12 cents. The reason its value had dropped so low was because of Saddam’s inflationary monetary policy. In comparison, back in the '80s, before the Saddam dinar came about, the rate of exchange was about $3 to one dinar. But because of Saddam there was now a total upside-down situation where one dollar was worth about 2,300 dinar.

Q: Wow, that's incredible inflation.
TANT: Incredible inflation. That was another reason that we had to change out the currency. What we needed, and Ambassador Bremer recognized this early on, was a single, stable, secure, convenient, and meaningful currency for the people. They needed a single currency, mainly for the reason that I described earlier, in that when you're unifying a country, you don't want to have two currencies in it. That doesn't make any sense. And you need a secure currency, because Saddam's currency was so highly counterfeited. The Saddam dinar was made on cheap paper and didn't have many protective measures, so it was easily and widely counterfeited.

As a matter of fact, the Secret Service lady who briefed me right before I went to the airport on 9/11/2003 said “You're going to the counterfeit capital of the world, where nearly two to three notes of 1,000 are considered counterfeit.” She provided me with a nice package of how to identify counterfeit currency. It had beautiful color pictures of what counterfeit Iraqi dinar looked like under ultraviolet light (We provided ultraviolet lights to all of the banks who participated in the exchange program). So looking at the situation, you needed a single currency, you needed a secure currency, you needed a stable currency. The currency was not stable because it had such a wide change in value over a relatively short period of time. I mean, there was drastic change.

For a people that want to reestablish their economy, a good, stable currency is an absolutely critical first step. It’s a foundation step towards building a new economy. On the 7th of July 2003, Ambassador Bremer announced that there would be a currency exchange conducted from the October 15th 2003 to January 15 2004. The exchange would be nationwide, and that's what we did. Another component is that you need a convenient currency. As I mentioned, Saddam's currency was basically two denominations, the equivalent of a 12-cent note and a $5 note. You can just imagine how difficult that is for a shopkeeper or a shopper to deal with that.