For Iraq after Daesh

March 20, 2017

With the launch of operations edit the west side of the city of Mosul, which was announced by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi on Sunday February 19 last, the countdown has begun for the Liberation of the left coast. Optimists believe that the coming days will witness the final elimination of al Daesh in Iraq.

There are contrasting visions of the restoration of the right side of the connector , which consists of 94 alive will not be an easy process, but will face more complex than the left side obstacles , including:


1. geographical nature that the advantage of this aspect of the city, which is characterized by the convergence of houses and narrow streets and lanes, being old and slums and densely populated, Vdiq streets limits the wheels movement and the pieces of armored, population density and high limit the ability to use heavy weapons aerial and artillery bombardment because it will sign a significant loss of civilians.

The bad weather and low visibility due to fog and precipitation will lead to the suspension of military operations, the weakness of air support and an inability to sustain the momentum of the attack, which gives an opportunity for the units Alangmasah of state regulation -walta fighting professionally in the war Alasabat- that seeks to change the field equation on the ground .


2. The destruction of bridges connecting both sides of the city by the international airline alliance was a double-edged sword; it was the cause of progress and control on the left side to cut off military supplies and logistics for the organization.

And now constitute inhibitor watery major obstacle to provide troops to cross into the West second to the speed of the river flow, and not the validity of the banks of the bridge due to the rise in many regions, in addition to weakness troops during transit so that they can be targeted shelling and mortars and Hunting, I think the dilemma to keep the target will be more difficult than grab it.


3. the absence of a prior plan for the development of shelter camps will leave thousands of civilians out in the cold, because of the destruction of bridges and their inability to move toward the left side, where it is expected exodus of very large numbers as soon as the raging battles and lose control of the organization civilians.

And you'll find these same forces before the fight the streets of a war option of high cost; where fluent fighters organize this kind of fighting, which is characterized by neutralizing some of the strength of the attacking forces of factors, such as aerial bombardment and intensive artillery fire a long-range, and bombs with the destructive force that received the strategic long-range bombers. In order to understand the factors moving in the course of the battle and Maladtha, the analysis will address the importance of the west side of the city of Mosul to the ends of the battle, and the obstacles to be resolved for any of them.

In addition to editing the western side of Mosul is not linked to the military factor, but also linked to political complexities have not been resolved yet, as the western Mosul linked Tal Afar blockaded by the popular crowd forces without Tguethmha because local and regional reservations, Valhacd popular and backed by the system Iran is seeking to deepen its role in the Mosul operation and incursions in the geographic areas occupies a prominent place him may be Afar for the crowd is more important than the restoration of the city of Mosul itself as it represents for the Iranian regime of demographic and strategic significance, and this point may be the battle gateway to the regional conflict between both between him and Turkey. Fbhjh trapping Daesh and prevent their escape Bathah Syria seeks to expand the popular crowd in Tal Afar to secure land line toward Syria first, and secondly the presence of Shi'ite population there. Analyses indicate that the Iranian regime was able during the last period of the secure areas of influence controlled by the militia, the popular crowd, as is happening in Diyala, which is controlled by the Badr militia, as well as in Samarra and other areas Astrutegeyh while Iran seeks incursion in Tal Afar within the same target.

For its part, Turkey hints at military intervention in the event of breaking into the popular crowd, citing the presence of Tal Afar, a Turkmen majority of Sunnis and Shiites there. Inma raises this argument Turkish concerns that announced about a possible outbreak of a broad sectarian conflict caused by the participation of the popular crowd at the Battle of Mosul and its repercussions will be reflected on Turkey's security result, which could split the region into a Sunni two axes representing populated Turkmen, who went to seek protection from Turkey and Shiite representatives of the Shiite population and militia crowd PDF stands behind Iran, so the city of Tal Afar riskier strategy could push Turkey for military intervention, as happened in Syria through the shield of the Euphrates and the outbreak of a sectarian conflict between Iran and Turkey.

The same problem faces the predominantly Yazidi Sinjar city, controlled by «PKK», central reservations Turkey and forces «Peshmerga» subsidiary «Democratic Party of Kurdistan», led by President of the Kurdistan region, Massoud Barzani, who is under great pressure from Ankara in order to get rid of «Kurdistan» as well as the Kurdish internal pressure demanding the annexation of the city to the region. Between Tehran and Ankara, a new element entered the Iraqi Kurdish equation, is the Kurdistan Workers' Party, became a partner in the duo Sinjar in other regions of the province.

There are those who violate this analysis and believes that the battle of the western side of Mosul will not be difficult for the Iraqi army, citing the nature of the western side of the city's neighborhoods. Because most districts of this aspect of the alleys and narrow lanes and crowded city, so the Daesh will not be able to use conventional weapons, especially vehicles mined, which would make him lose the most important weapon of deterrence possessed. Observers believe that the Iraqi army has gained good experience during the war in the eastern part of Mosul and other Iraqi cities that were under the control of Daesh and learn his style of fighting inside cities and streets, which favors the Army especially as it has a more sophisticated owned Daesh weapons, as well the air cover that will come from the international coalition and the Iraqi air Force. The question in this context the importance of the Battle of Mosul, the Iraqi government and Daesh?

The importance of the western side of the existence of the most important government institutions, such as City Hall and the municipal presidency Nineveh court and government complex and the Directorate of the provincial police and other institutions, including sugar and Camp Ghazlani Airport Mosul and other plant; also likely presence of the headquarters of the leadership Daesh centers and control and the headquarters of the establishment of its leaders and their families since the control of the city which is the last urban stronghold in Iraq. The restoration of the city of Mosul, Iraq's second city in terms of population density, of paramount importance to the Iraqi government in the way of restoring sovereignty over the entire territory of Iraq and recover the prestige of the state and the armed forces, in addition to their importance in the order situation in the post-battle ends to avoid Iraq's slide to a local conflict between the components that make up the city of Mosul, an ethnically and religiously diverse potentially explosive against the backdrop of conflicts for power and resources between the components of Iraqi society. Estimates indicate that between 600 to 750 thousand people living in the west side of the city of Mosul; The presence of these populations fear that caused the fight to bring about widespread destruction of residential neighborhoods and the occurrence of civilian casualties in large numbers.

As for the importance of the western side of the Battle of Mosul for Daesh, in the June 29, 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, "declared the Islamic caliphate," one of the largest mosques in the city of Mosul; Seizing an opportunity feelings of the majority population of Sunni Arabs, disaffected exclusionary Iraqi government policies, to present himself as a protector of their violations and violations of sectarian militias. The production of cereals constitute one-third of the total production of Iraq, and includes areas a number of oil fields, which provide for the organization of a major source of financial revenue; in addition to the fact the land routes linking Iraq to Turkey to the north and Syria to the west, and the importance of this road the territorial contiguity with the tenderness of the Syrian city putative capital of the organization. After losing the eastern side of the city of Mosul, the west side has become a for Daesh last remaining city under his control; and in this aspect is the command and control sites and booby-trapping wheels and workshops mic weapons and equipment centers, in addition to the presence of the families of the leaders and fighters of the organization.

Eventually the Iraqi forces and the international coalition will be able to edit the connector from the grip Daesh early this year. However, due to the successes of the organization «Daesh» and his predecessors in the registration exciting returns to the city in 2004, 2007 and 2014, it is justified to wonder what will deter the organization or any similar group for hiding and advancement again and blow up the precious gains of the current war achieved. The people of Mosul experience with «Daesh» was already bitter, and the visitors left part of the city can be groping his level of enthusiasm of the population to defeat the «Management», despite the heavy the prices they paid. This talk does not seek to say that «Daesh» foreign body from the formula here, but to say that there is really a traumatic experience the city experienced in the past three years, an experience that does not look like all the tragic experiences in Iraq in the past two decades, and this is what brings the population . The question in this context: What is the lesson we can draw from history?


Establish stability in Mosul: lessons learned between 2008 and 2014

Although the political agreements on the "public view" for the future of the connector may be decisive in the end, remains the highest priority of the international-Iraqi alliance is to ensure the security of Mosul very practical ways.

We can learn a lot about the next critical steps in Mosul If we look at the different periods of the history of modern Mosul.

• partial success when the United States attached great importance . Between 2007 and 2011, " the Iraqi security forces , " the US - backed achieved great successes, resulting in a reduction of security incidents in the city , the level is very high reached 666 incidents per month in the first quarter of 2008 to an average of 32 incidents in the first quarter of 2011 .

• Catastrophic failure when the United States turned its back . Between 2011 and 2014, reflected oriented, that the pacemonthly security incidentsincreased toaverage of 297 infirst quarter of 2014. Shortly after, acquiredorganization «Islamic state» onconnector and onethirdIraq in June 2014.


Establishing successful instability, 2007 - 2011 engines

You can easily explain the successes achieved between 2007 and 2011 and the failures recorded between 2011 and 2014. During the first period, Baghdad was keen to ensure the stability of Mosul poured Iraqi Prime Minister (Nuri al-Maliki at the time), focus on the subject, was allowed by the center, such as partial amnesty and reopen recruitment [devices] security officers of the former regime. The elections resulted in the formation of the provincial council and the Governor [understands], and led to enable Mosul's population of Sunni Arabs in the urban areas of identification with him.

When the US Army entrenched in Mosul until 2011, "Iraqi security forces" managed to create a "unity of command" key, it has been awarded a major leadership positions to officers and the Koran, including Mosul's population of Sunni Arabs, and partly due to the insistence of the United States In this regard. And it has increased the number of available government forces in Mosul, including through local recruitment of large numbers of the population in Sunni Arab neighborhoods poorer than others in Mosul.


Trying to establish the causes of instability, failed 2011-2014

During the period between 2011 and 2014, in contrast from previous years, was a triumph of organization «Islamic state» is guaranteed because of the lack of unity of effort and a lack of unity of command chronically among the Iraqi government and Kurdish factions and the factions of Nineveh. He worked all of Nineveh province's leaders, backed by the Kurds and Baghdad to achieve the conflicting goals throughout the period of three years.

Indeed, resulted in the "command climate" developed by the military leaders of Baghdad politically appointed for [the] security forces carried out operations designed to humiliate and punish the inhabitants of Mosul, who are from the majority Sunni Arab. Since the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki began his second term in 2010, Baghdad has decided to tamper with the affairs of command and control in Mosul, along came the security structure is politicized to a reasonable extent that existed up to that point. The constant change of leaders has led to the destruction of remaining within the docking "of the Iraqi security forces."

Given the strategic opportunity posed by the liberalization of Mosul in the future - an opportunity may not be repeated - is to absorb these lessons and make use of them is very important. And assuming no flow "Peshmerga" Kurdish forces or Shiite militias to the city, a result that seems to be the coalition prevented achieved, it may be of Mosul's residents initially more open to cooperation with the "Iraqi security forces" Ever since 2003, after two and a half from submitting to the rule of Daesh. But Mosul's residents will watch their editors closely for any signs that the return to the 2014 scenario prevailed when punitive measures were issued banning orders strict curfew and deployed the specter of arrests on a large scale.

On the political level, there must be a genuine and realistic power in Nineveh consensus, not just a changing series of alliances based on the principle of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." This process is still in its early stages, but the US-led coalition scored a good start in this regard through a combination between Baghdad and the Kurds, as well as the leadership of Nineveh province to conduct a public debate. It must be based agreement between the parties on the simple ground rules of political behavior future. In such an arrangement, should the provincial council and any security coordination committee to be actors make decisions on the basis of consensus.

Similarly, should the recruitment and management of the affairs of local government bodies and the police process in accordance with a specific formula, that the residents of the city reflect the composition of the pre-regulation Daesh. The recruitment of local people from the cities to the police forces, including belonging to minorities, a priority. At the level of operations, requirements include appointments to lead a stable and non-politicized and provide unity and coordinate much more power between the Iraqi and Kurdish federal and local security forces in Nineveh. So should the United States think of taking five steps to counter Iranian influence in Iraq and prevent the return of al Daesh:


1. continue the international coalition 's commitment to [support] Baghdad by ensuring helping her in the following areas: preservation of Iraq 's border security (especially with Syria), and to deal with the escalating terrorism , which is almost certain to appear at defeating al «Islamic state» as a paramilitary traditional, creating a base for a multinational security project which will continue after the war on the organization «Islamic state.» The so maintaining the "Joint Task Force - » the solution process inherent « " an international alliance of large - scale rather than allowing , falling to just US mission with some of the younger partners. In addition, Washington should agree on a new package of "training and equipping Iraq 's Fund 2" ( ITEF II ) standing three years for Iraqi security forces to cover the years 2017 to 2020 to replace the "train and equip Iraq 's Fund" (ITEF) , which covers the years 2014 to 20177.


2. reconsider its approach , "Joint Task Force" to help the security forces, and build on the successes of training in the past year in order to create a more effective counter - insurgency Iraqi force. Instead of trying to create a Western military force mini, the United States and its allies to take into account the new options is aware of local cultural realities, so as to avoid the incentive structures that generate corruption and prevent Iraqi forces from preparing for combat operations and to achieve stability as appropriate. In addition to strengthening the partnership in Iraqi politics, will form this action the best way to prevent the return of al «Islamic state» and the growth of Iranian influence through «units of the popular crowd».


3. Help Baghdad to resist the pressure to institutionalize «units of the popular crowd» pro-Iranian military force and large parallel, and well - funded and able compete with the Iraqi security forces. The best way to achieve this in the victory at the Battle of Mosul without relying heavily on «units of the popular crowd», and then maintain a strong and effective international efforts to assist the security forces. It is also important to pay attention to the large number of officers in "counterterrorism" in the high ranks of the Iraqi army. The United States will not have partners in the long run the most important of these trained officers on hand, so it is necessary to listen to them and protect them from intimidation militias and support them in their careers.


4. deter Iran by referring quietly that the United States will not tolerate any attacks by Iranian agents on its soldiers in Iraq. This includes clarifying that such incidents would have negative consequences for Iran 's advisers in the region, as well as naval vessels for «Islamic Revolutionary Guard» if the Highlight US ships in the Gulf. To enhance the credibility of these warnings, Washington should continue to deter Iran partners destabilizing activities in other places in the region, such as the Huthi forces that seek to obstruct the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Bab el Mandeb.


5 . Preparing for a campaign to inform and influence documented Iranian defective activities in Iraq , including unfair trade practices, and undue influence in politics, and care of the violence against Iraqis. And such a campaign may provide strengths against Iran, especially if the use of information Ktalegh warning and dissemination through the media that do not normally tend to Washington. Iran has never enjoyed great popularity in Iraq, even among the Shiites (though the battle against al «Islamic state» have reduced this resentment). Therefore, the Iraqis may be interested to know the true price of the Iranian military support and income from gas and electricity, and how to coercion and violence constitute the true face of the bunker Shiite religious tourism that Iran 's majority, and how that food revenues from Iran are exempt from customs duties have a negative effect on the Iraqi farmers. Finally, the defeat of the organization «Islamic state» in Iraq may reduce domestic support for the presence of the Iranian charge in Syria, which creates favorable conditions for the campaign 's influence in Iran shed light on these costs and the complexity of political Tehran 's ability to project power in the region. The question in this context Can Donald Trump Management demolition of houses built by the Iranian regime in Iraq and correct the error Aloamrakih policy in Iraq after 2003?

Observers of the Iraqi would agree that the battle to liberate Mosul will be a watershed for the future stage, Iraqis are the two choices are only two, and the selection of new leaders to save the country from destruction collapse that reached by the extremism, sectarian and racial and rampant corruption and failure since 2003, or stay on the ruling mental same policies will pull the country inevitably towards further deterioration and division, crises and wars are not the first nor last in the struggle over areas of interest and to serve other countries projects, which came to us scenarios sectarian strife and «Al-Qaeda» and «Daesh» and others will hide from the planning policies in the area.

In conclusion after «Daesh» Iraq awaits Arab-Kurdish relationship benefits, Sunni and Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish, Shiite and Kurdish, not to mention the inter-relationships within each composite of these compounds, all of which are prone to explosion. So no one is optimistic post-war in Mosul, although the victory looms.


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