The Dinar Daily, Saturday January 31, 2015
Page 1 of 9 123 ... LastLast
Results 1 to 10 of 86

Thread: The Dinar Daily, Saturday January 31, 2015

  1. #1

    The Dinar Daily, Saturday January 31, 2015

    The Exchange Rate of Foreign Currency in Economic Feasibility Studies

    Below are the central controls related to the exchange rate of the foreign currency to convert the project inputs and outputs from foreign currency to its equivalent in the local currency, and that is by calculating the net discounted present value standard and the internal return on investments in economic analysis that governs investment projects that costs excess one million dinars.

    Estimate the shadow price of foreign currency:

    1. It is necessary to put central controls to amend the official exchange rate * to reflect the shadow price of the foreign currency, and that is considered one of the necessary requirements to implement the net discounted present value standard and the internal return rate on investment in the economic calculation stated in the instructions, paragraph nine.

    The central controls for adjusting market prices distinguished a group of outputs and inputs traded internationally, where the projects production or usage of them is reflected on the abundance of foreign currency in the economy and thus project outputs or inputs used of such are considered purely foreign currency outputs or inputs.

    * What is meant by exchange rate: the number of units of foreign currency, expressed in dollar per one dinar.In particular the following outputs and inputs of foreign currency were distinguished:

    • Export-outputs.
    • Outputs marketed locally that substitute imports.
    • Imported inputs.
    • Inputs produced locally that usually go to exports.
    • Foreign labor.

    According to the pricing rules the value of the output and input (traded) is calculated using export prices (FOB) and import prices (CIF), according to what is listed in the pricing rules.

    In other words the pricing rules calculate what the project produces from foreign currency (quantity of exports multiplied by the export price (FOB) in foreign currency or the quantity of substitute imports multiplied by the import price (CIF) in foreign currency, as well as what the project uses from foreign currency and imported inputs multiplied by the import price (CIF) in foreign currency …. etc.).

    In a later step, project outputs and inputs must be converted from the foreign currency to its equivalent in local currency (dinars) by using a specific exchange rate for the foreign currency.

    2. Justifications for exchange-rate adjustment: there are a number of important and powerful arguments which support the view that the official exchange rate reduces the real value of foreign currency for purposes of calculating the economic national profitability for investment projects and hence for the purposes of investment planning. It is demonstrated in this context to call for assessing the dinar for less than (3.208) dollar (official exchange rate) when assessing project outputs and inputs of traded goods of exports, substitute imports and imports… etc.

    The justifications to call for the use of an exchange rate that is lower than the official exchange rate are:

    • The use of an exchange rate that is lower than the official rate is the appropriate action at the investment planning level to translate the country’s economic strategy aiming at stimulating central investments in the sectors that encourage the development of non-oil exports, as well as sectors that encourage the expansion of domestic production base in order to reduce imports and compensate it with local commodities. This helps to reduce reliance on foreign exchange earnings from crude oil exports and increases the share of non-oil sectors in the local production.
    • The application of the amended exchange rate on project imported inputs will assist in directing investments away from aggregated sectors dependent on imported inputs and the preference of those sectors that rely on locally produced inputs.
    • The use of the amended exchange rate helps to correct the balance in favor of the traded goods sectors compared to non-traded goods.
    • The real exchange rate has declined rapidly since the early seventies, through rapid rise of the level of prices and local costs which led by the steadiness of the official exchange rate to change in prices and actual local rate costs that gave an advantage for imported goods at the expense of locally produced goods, meaning that it led to deterioration of the competitiveness of alternative replacement goods and export commodities.
    • This action shows that the official exchange rate overestimates the value of the dinar, compared to the foreign currency and from the promoting goods substituting imports and export commodities point of view of.

    And in support to this view is the state’s utilization and in a broad approach to the customs and quantitative protection policies especially for consumer goods, as well as export subsidies that exports have through an amended export exchange rate.

    3. Estimate the amended exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar to be used in technical and economical feasibility studies and for (1.134) dollar per dinar. This price should be approved for 3 years until re-appreciation by the competent authorities.

    The Republic of Iraq – Ministry of Planning


    A "flashback recap" of a Live Q and A Call from about a year ago - on THE DAILY DINAR NEWS BLOG...

    In general terms – there were three main focal points of interest I wanted to cover and then allow listeners to ask whatever questions they liked.

    1) the SIGR report…

    2) the Gold Article…

    3) the IIER report…

    I started the conversation out last night by highlighting how crazy this campaign being fielded to contact our lawmakers and bank CEO’s and tell them how unfair it is they are getting to exchange (exchange is the right terminology BTW – NOT “CASH-IN”) at 32.00 per Dinar and we are not – is. It is nuts.

    Firstly, “they” are NOT being allowed to exchange “early” – or at 32.00 per Dinar. It makes you sound “stark raving MAD” to be caught saying such things. You would be better off barking at the moon. It is demeaning to the validity of a true currency play.

    Secondly, this is entirely the wrong way to approach them. I pointed out on the call that Poppy and I fielded a very successful such campaign a couple of years ago. However, we sat down and came up with a much different approach. It was designed to get answers and to approach our lawmakers with respect and as their constituents. Not like a bunch of lunatics. We had extraordinary participation (because it made sense) and we received a good response from lawmakers. It started the conversation in a reasonable manner.

    I asked one caller – “when was the last time you asked a banker for money and told him how unfair it was if he didn’t give it to you”??? Obviously – we chuckled…

    Another caller asked me if (as DC had relayed) – the “zero’s were raised” and the lower denominations were in circulation??

    I said plainly “no”…lower denominations being in circulation would (at the very least) imply there had been a value change. If there were no value change the lower denoms would not only be of little value, they would be such a hinderance – people might even throw them away just to get rid of them. So no – no lower denoms. I told the caller to check the website for “real” info on rate change.

    The “zero’s being raised” or “deleted” – as explained by any reasonable researcher, economist or authority – is simply the process removing the large (3 zero notes) from circulation.

    Referring to an Enorrste post from today on
    THE DINAR OBSERVER DAILY(you may want to put this on your favorites and check in several times a day – we to it often )

    “…I have never found a single article from the CBI or the IMF that equates “delete the zeros” to the idea of “move the decimal point.” Instead, the statements overwhelmingly come out to mean “remove the large notes from circulation.”

    Also – this recent internal memo put out by Wells Fargo is likely “push back” from this recent campaign. I pointed out that Pinnacle Bank published an article by an “affiliate” in their internal publication and then “highlighted it” in a similar internal memo a couple of years ago. It is just a defense mechanism. I’m sure Wells is tired of having their name dragged through the “internet rumor mill”. This is highly likely the reason for their vigorous denials about handling it in the future. They get so many useless calls – it isn’t worth the headache. Can you blame them??

    Further, for any bank, lawmaker, adviser or official to state the “Dinar is a scam” is nearly as foolish as some of the internet “Gurus”. It is the official currency of a COUNTRY. I pointed out (below) the post from yesterday’s
    – highlights page 94 of the quarterly SIGR report to THE US CONGRESS in April of 2012…
    __________________________________________________ _____________


    We are seeing and hearing that the inflation rate is still climbing and they are pushing to get us our money?? This report is from page 84 of the massive SIGR report.

    BGG ~
    This is a screen shot from the “Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction” – Apr 2012, quarterly report to Congress. For members of our Government to say they have no idea what is going on here – means they haven’t read some very basic documents presented them.
    __________________________________________________ ______________

    I pointed out (last night) this is a highly speculative investment. We are, in no way, guaranteed anything. However, this SIGR report gives us some valuable insights…

    1) This is information given to the US CONGRESS on a quarterly basis… I find it hard to believe such an information source would intentionally mislead Congress. They tend to frown on such behavior. Which goes directly to the validity of this adventure – against all advice from Wells Fargo or other such naysayers.

    2) It points out there having been a legitimate “plan” – or time frame in motion…having been projected to be done in 2013. We are obviously in “over time” now.

    3) It gives us an idea as to who is in charge…the CoM – or Council of Ministers. Who do they answer to?? Maliki. Period. When is he likely to push this forward?? Historically – he has been a “weak Dinar” policy advocate. However, rumor from his own inner circle admits he can’t win a third term in office without some currency reform.

    I fully expect him to use every tool in his “wheel house” to win – his recent moves in Anbar and the disputed territories prove as much. Currency reform has to be a “biggie”. Though this WAS their thinking a couple of months ago – there is no promise it is still part of their political calculus. We shall see.

    4) Though no guarantee of the actual future plan they wind up engaging – this report points out an increase in value that would have taken the Dinar from “one-tenth of a cent” to a value “of slightly less than $1″..

    __________________________________________________ ______________


    Coins put on the market !!

    Nora Albjara member of the committee of economy and investment in the House of Representatives revealed that the central bank completed its preparations for the issuance of metal coins of seven small groups, in conjunction with the implementation of the project to delete the three zeroes from the paper currency is currently in circulation.

    She said in her statement Albjara "The project will take between four and five years, and which will be the launch of the categories of small coins gradually."

    He predicted the financial expert Hilal Taan inflation rate declines, with the issuance of metal coins of small denominations in the daily financial transactions, remarkable that 3% of the value of inflation in Iraq due to the presence of large cash block.

    The economic expert on behalf of Jamil Anton, noted that he may not find metal coins accepted by a lot of Iraqis, especially young people, due to the existence of an entire generation of Iraqis had not trading coins due to stop use since the early nineties of the twentieth century


    CBI is preparing to issue a monetary metal parts

    Metal coins from the category of 25 fils were in circulation until the nineties of the last century

    Nora Albjara member of the committee of economy and investment in the House of Representatives revealed that the central bank completed its preparations for the issuance of metal coins of seven small groups, in conjunction with the implementation of the project to delete the three zeroes from the paper currency is currently in circulation.

    She said in her statement Albjara Radio Free Iraq, "said the project will take between four and five years, and which will be the launch of the categories of small coins gradually."

    He predicted the financial expert Hilal Taan inflation rate declines, with the issuance of metal coins of small denominations in the daily financial transactions, remarkable that 3% of the value of inflation in Iraq due to the presence of large cash block.

    The economic expert on behalf of Jamil Anton, noted that he may not find coins accepted by a lot of Iraqis, especially young people, due to the existence of an entire generation of Iraqis had not trading coins due to stop use since the early nineties of the twentieth century.


    Another "FLASHBACK"...

    Economists Divided Over Deletion Of Zeros

    By Amina al-Dahabi for Al-Monitor.

    The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has been attempting to delete three zeros from the Iraqi currency since 2003. This project has raised many concerns among the Iraqi public and within the business community, and Iraqi economists are divided…

    …Haider al-Abadi, the head of the Iraqi parliamentary Finance Committee, told Al-Monitor that while deleting zeros from the current currency is possible, this has been postponed until after parliamentary elections. He noted that studies are being carried out to ensure that, following the currency change, counterfeiting is limited and that Iraqis don’t go back to trading in the old currency.

    The step to delete zeros from the currency has been postponed several times, leading the parliamentary Economic Committee to demand that the CBI accelerate this project, as Al-Sharqiya reported. In a news conference held July 6, the Economic Committee confirmed that the deletion of zeros will lead to an increase in the value of the Iraqi dinar and will have positive repercussions, including a reduction in unemployment and poverty rates in the country.


    Crush Expected When Kuwaiti Banks Reopen Today

    March 24, 1991|From Reuters

    KUWAIT CITY, Kuwait — Thousands of Kuwaitis are expected to jam the country's banks today when they open for the first time since the end of the Iraqi occupation.

    Customers will be allowed to withdraw funds and to swap pre-invasion money for a new currency issued to make more than $1 billion in pre-invasion dinars stolen by the Iraqis worthless.

    "We expect a rush of people," said Issam Asousi, an executive with the Bank of Kuwait. He said it could be a chaotic first week because customers have a lot of questions about their accounts.

    Kuwaiti banks continued operating during the seven-month Iraqi occupation under managers brought in from Iraq, but they have been closed since the U.S.-led alliance ousted the Iraqi army from Kuwait a month ago.

    When the banks reopen today, customers will be able to withdraw up to 4,000 Kuwaiti dinars, equivalent to about $14,000 at pre-invasion exchange rates from their accounts, and to exchange a like amount for foreign currency.

    Balances of customers' accounts will go back to what they were on Aug. 1, a day before the invasion.

    Clients will not be able to exchange Iraqi currency issued during the occupation, when Baghdad pegged the rates of the strong Kuwaiti dinar to the far less valuable Iraqi dinar.

    The new Kuwaiti money will be exchanged for old at a one-to-one rate.

    BGG ~ Thanks to wmawhite for some facts on the subject.

    Hi BGG,

    Just thought I would drop you an email. I listened to the call, and was interested in what was said about Kuwait, if I may - I will add my 2 cents worth.

    You were spot on with what you said, I have a close friend who's father made a killing on the KWD. He bought from people who had fled the country and he paid pennies on the dollar (we are in Australia). He took the chance that Iraq would be kicked back out and he was right.

    When the money was reinstated, he exchanged it for AUD at a rate in the mid 3s. The interesting thing about it is, Iraq invaded in November 1990 (I think), they were kicked back out at the end of Feb 1991, the banks reopened with a brand new KWD in late March, that's not a bad time frame to get a currency designed, printed and made ready to use, also the time that the old KWD was valid was initially only for 2 months, then extended to 6, so it was valid until Sept 1991, interesting I think.

    Also the other thing that seems to be a "fact" in Dinar land is Bill Clinton used the Kuwait RV to pay off the debt. However, Clinton was not President in 91, he did not take office until 93, even I know that and I am an Aussie.

    Anyway thanks for the site and enjoy listening to your calls.

    Kind Regards,
    Last edited by chattels; 02-01-2015 at 11:47 AM.

  2. #2

    National Reconciliation Conference News Thread



    'How This Ends':
    Iraq's Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation
    Michael Eisenstadt and Ahmed Ali
    Also available in العربية
    Policy #1553
    July 17, 2009
    During Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki's visit to Washington next week, the Obama administration will likely seek to reinvigorate that country's flagging reconciliation process as part of ongoing efforts to establish a stable political order in Iraq. Progress, however, continues to be hindered by ongoing violence, deep-seated suspicions, and partisan politics, raising questions about the ultimate prospects for national reconciliation.

    Reconciliation and Postconflict Stability

    The process by which war-torn societies heal is imperfectly understood. Experience, however, suggests that societies undertaking a formal reconciliation process to consolidate domestic peace agreements have a better chance of avoiding further civil conflict than those that do not.

    Before 2003, U.S. and Iraqi thinking about reconciliation focused largely on the legacy of Saddam Hussein. Today, after six years of insurgency and civil war, reconciliation must also deal with the legacy of violence among ethnosectarian groups, and between former insurgents and the Iraqi government.

    Successful reconciliation efforts, such as those in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Mozambique, South Africa, and Uruguay, require courageous and visionary leadership, and often involve the following elements:

    Truth telling, which permits victims to share traumas and perpetrators to acknowledge guilt
    Redefining social identities by portraying both victims and perpetrators as fellow citizens
    Partial justice, where victims are compensated and at least some of the perpetrators are punished
    Public events that promote forgiveness and new beginnings
    Most of these aspects, however, are missing from Iraq's flawed reconciliation process, which encompasses a diverse array of activities involving a broad array of actors -- the Iraqi and U.S. governments, nongovernmental and international organizations (NGOs and IOs), and neighboring states. These activities are often based on divergent assumptions about the nature of reconciliation and the means to achieving it.

    U.S. Efforts

    Since 2003, the United States has promoted reconciliation through the following activities:

    Working to incorporate Sunni Arabs into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the political process
    Making amends for the inadvertent killing of Iraqi civilians by offering apologies and compensation
    Engaging "reconcilable" elements in the Sunni Arab insurgency that are willing to join the political process
    Mending ties between estranged communities (Sunnis and Shiites, Arabs and Kurds) by organizing meetings to address common problems
    Pressing the Iraqi government to legislate the integration of former insurgents and disenfranchised communities into the political process
    Documenting property claims and disputes
    A tendency to view Iraq almost exclusively through an ethnosectarian prism undermined early U.S. reconciliation efforts and unwittingly contributed to the polarization of Iraqi society. Inadequate resourcing, a lack of interagency coordination, and a refusal to talk with insurgents also hindered these efforts.

    The U.S. took a new approach in the runup to and during the 2007 troop surge, when the U.S. military opted to work with former insurgents from various Awakening groups, known as Sons of Iraq (SOI), to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). These bottom-up efforts, which focused mainly on reconciliation between U.S. forces and local Iraqi communities and insurgent groups, enjoyed significant success. During the surge, however, broadened efforts to reconcile estranged Iraqi communities, and former insurgents with the Iraqi government, witnessed only mixed success.

    Iraqi Efforts

    Many Iraqis saw the post-Saddam government's early attempts at reconciliation by retribution and compensation as nothing more than victor's justice. Retribution was carried out by de-Baathification and the trial of former regime personalities such as Saddam Hussein and Ali Hassan al-Majid (Chemical Ali). Compensation was achieved through the establishment of government foundations to care for Iraqis who had been maimed, imprisoned, or killed by the previous regime.

    In June 2006, shortly after becoming prime minister, al-Maliki announced a twenty-four-point national reconciliation plan that included provisions for amnesty, conferences, a review of de-Baathification procedures, compensation for victims, punishment for terrorists and war criminals, and the creation of the Supreme Committee for Dialogue and National Reconciliation (SCDNR). Minister of State for National Dialogue Affairs Akram al-Hakim, a close associate of al-Maliki, heads this committee, an organization that attempts to engage Iraqi tribes, civil society organizations, political parties, and religious leaders. Al-Hakim oversees, at least in theory, all governmental entities involved in reconciliation, although quite tellingly, the committee lacks a professional staff and remains unfunded (parliament rescinded $65 million earmarked by the Council of Ministers).

    The Iraqi government's principal operational arm for reconciliation is the Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR), which was established in June 2007 and is currently headed by Muhammad Salman al-Saadi, another al-Maliki associate. While formally under the purview of SCDNR, it actually reports directly to the prime minister and enjoys a high degree of autonomy. It deals mainly with the vetting of former regime personnel, tribal affairs (including both Awakening and tribal support councils), internally displaced persons, access to basic services (denial of which was used in the past to punish perceived enemies), and job creation issues.

    In September 2007, the Iraqi parliament established the ad hoc National Reconciliation Committee (NRC). The independent Sunni parliamentarian Wathab Shaker heads this committee, and its dozen or so members are drawn from nearly all major parties. The NRC is not, however, a major player. Its primary activities include working for the release of mainly Sunni detainees and serving occasionally as an interlocutor to the Arab League.

    In January 2008, the Iraqi parliament passed the Accountability and Justice Law to supplant the de-Baathification system established in 2003 by the Coalition Provisional Authority. Although some of its provisions are improvements -- less stringent criteria for de-Baathification, more generous pensions for dismissed personnel, forfeiture of restored rights in the event of demonstrated culpability for criminal acts, and an independent appeals mechanism -- others are not, such as exceptions to the new de-Baathification criteria and the wholesale dismissal from government service of former employees of Baath-era security agencies. The commission required to implement the law, moreover, has not yet been established.

    In addition to these top-down governmental efforts, a number of bottom-up initiatives have originated from civil society, in the form of community and tribal gatherings.

    The Iraqi government's reconciliation activities have been hampered by the taint of politicization and the lack of follow-through. A desire for revenge rather than reconciliation was seen as driving early de-Baathification efforts and trials of former regime personalities, further polarizing Iraqi society. Al-Maliki uses IFCNR to extend patronage to his supporters, such as the tribal support councils, and to exert leverage over his former enemies, while members of parliament apparently drove the creation of the NRC to ensure that the government addressed their reconciliation agenda.

    Since al-Maliki outlined his ambitious agenda in 2006, accomplishments have been modest. Although dismissed army officers have been reinstated, personnel from the former regime's security forces have been paid their pensions, and local reconciliation efforts have gone well, problems remain. The Accountability and Justice Law remains largely unimplemented, key proposed amendments to the constitution have not been passed, and it is unclear whether the government will find stable employment for the eighty percent of former SOI militiamen who not being integrated into the ISF.

    Finally, differences between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have been dealt with primarily by deferring difficult decisions on such key issues as the status of Kirkuk, governance in Ninawa province, oil, peshmerga/ISF relations, and the KRG constitution.

    NGOs, IOs, and Neighbors

    Numerous foreign NGOs have supported the reconciliation process by training conflict resolution facilitators and sponsoring workshops and conferences to promote dialogue among Iraqis, resolve local conflicts, and forge a common future vision for the country.

    The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has promoted reconciliation by supporting elections, working to resolve the issue of Kirkuk, and helping draft the International Compact with Iraq. The Arab League sponsored the Conference for National Reconciliation in Cairo in November 2005 and dispatched a permanent mission to Baghdad in April 2006. The League's effectiveness, however, has been limited due to its failure to continuously staff its Baghdad office and tensions between its largely Sunni Arab membership and the largely Shiite Iraqi government. Finally, the government of Jordan has hosted a number of conferences to promote dialogue and reconciliation among Iraqis.

    While it is hard to assess the overall impact of these diverse activities, some NGO-sponsored peace-building efforts have yielded important local benefits.

    Reconciliation Challenges

    A number of factors are likely to complicate efforts to achieve national reconciliation in Iraq:

    Vested interests. Perhaps the biggest challenge is that key political parties have successfully exploited ethnosectarian grievances as a means of mobilizing support. These parties have a vested interest in perpetuating the political status quo and would stand to lose a great deal if a postsectarian style of politics in Iraq were to emerge as a result of a successful reconciliation process.

    Persistent violence. Ongoing violence, although at greatly reduced levels, prevents old wounds from healing, opens new wounds, and creates the potential for renewed civil war. This reality lends immediacy to one of the principal conclusions of a landmark World Bank study on civil conflict: nearly half of all countries emerging from civil war suffer a relapse within five years.

    Elusive consensus. Fundamental disagreements remain among Iraqis on a number of key issues, such as de-Baathification, the oil law, and Kirkuk. The fragmentation of Iraqi politics (more than four hundred parties and entities participated in recent provincial elections) complicates efforts to identify individuals capable of speaking for and negotiating on behalf of broad constituencies.

    Justice denied. Many of those responsible for the worst bloodletting in recent years -- including leaders of antigovernment insurgent groups and government death squads -- are still involved in public life as members of provincial councils, the ISF, or parliament and show no contrition for their actions.

    Demographic complexity. Because various population groups remain intermingled throughout the country despite years of ethnosectarian cleansing, incidents in one place may have broad consequences elsewhere.

    Multilayered conflicts. Iraq's civil war involved conflicts within, as well as between, communities: the "nationalist resistance" vs. AQI, Awakening councils vs. Islamists, Jaish al-Mahdi vs. ISF units aligned with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. For this reason, intra- and intercommunal reconciliation is needed. To date, most reconciliation efforts have focused on the legacy of intercommunal conflicts, though ultimately both legacies need to be addressed.

    Iraqi political culture. While Arab tribal culture and Islam have provided the normative justifications and mechanisms for reconciliation at the local level, the desire for revenge, a zero-sum approach to politics, and religious extremism have hindered reconciliation at the national level.

    Election-year politics. In March 2009, when the government expressed a willingness to reconcile with some Baathists, a number of civil society organizations (all apparently linked to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq) were formed to thwart these efforts. It will be difficult for the government to ignore these organizations in the run-up to the January 2010 elections, lest it appear "soft" on Baathism and lose the support of key constituencies.

    External meddling. Syria, the Gulf Arab states, and Iran supported groups such as AQI and Jaish al-Mahdi, contributing greatly to the 2006-2007 Iraqi civil war and ongoing violence. Preventing the arming, training, and funding of such spoilers is key to keeping the peace in Iraq and moving the reconciliation process forward.

    For all these reasons, Iraqis are likely to coexist uneasily for the foreseeable future. National reconciliation, if it occurs at all, could take years.

    Next Steps

    Preventing major renewed outbreaks of violence is an essential condition for successful reconciliation in Iraq. Accordingly, the main U.S. priorities in the next two years should be to press the Iraqi government to find stable employment -- even if "make work" -- for former SOI personnel and army officers who participated in the insurgency, and to prevent clashes between the ISF and KRG forces in contested areas.

    This will require the United States, first, to expend significant political capital to convince the Iraqi government to take steps it finds extremely distasteful and, second, to continue to discourage the KRG from undertaking actions that could be perceived as provocative by other Iraqis. By the same token, the United States will have to tolerate al-Maliki's efforts to reconcile with members of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's movement, including "special group" militants who have American blood on their hands.

    Furthermore, the United States and the international community should seek to advance the reconciliation process by:

    Working to enhance the capacity and professionalism of SCDNR and the Ministry of Justice, which plays a key role with regard to a number of potentially sensitive transitional justice issues
    Making foreign aid, investment, and debt forgiveness contingent on the Iraqi government's progress toward reconciliation, and by supporting, financially and materially, those organizations and entities, both Iraqi and foreign, actively working toward this goal
    Encouraging postsectarian politics in Iraq by funding NGOs that assist in the development of issue-based parties; urging the passage of a law that would require parties to declare sources of financing and proscribe funding from foreign sources (thereby reducing opportunities for foreign meddling in Iraqi politics); and pushing for the adoption of an open-list, multiple-district system for the January 2010 national elections, which is more likely to produce cross-sectarian political coalitions
    Fostering the creation of professional, nonsectarian civil service and security forces by offering merit-based training, education, and scholarships in the United States and elsewhere. Military assistance should be made contingent on continued progress toward creating an apolitical, professional, and reasonably representative officer corps
    Tapping into the widespread yearning for change in Iraq by issuing statements to the Iraqi and Arab media supportive of issue-based politics and free and fair elections. This will limit al-Maliki's ability to indulge his sectarian instincts and avoid meaningful reconciliation.
    Finally, the international community should encourage the establishment of an independent, nonpartisan Iraqi organization, whose board of governors is confirmed by parliament, to coordinate and prioritize nongovernmental reconciliation activities and to serve as a counterbalance to IFCNR and SCDNR. UNAMI, if properly resourced, might assist with this effort. Such an entity would help NGOs and local and provincial governments facilitate bottom-up reconciliation.

    Iraq is unlikely to resolve the many issues on its reconciliation agenda in the near -- or even distant -- future. Nonetheless, an energized reconciliation process that facilitates incremental progress on key issues, bolsters the security gains of the past two years, and helps tamp down ongoing violence is vital to the interests of both the United States and Iraq.

    The authors would like to acknowledge the work of William J. Long and Peter Brecke, authors of War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution. A list of additional published sources used in this paper is available upon request.

    Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow and director of The Washington Institute's Military and Security Studies Program. Ahmed Ali is a research associate at the Institute, focusing on Iraq and Iran.


    [B]National Reconciliation in Iraq

    Reality & Horizon


    Iraqi president announces steps towards national reconciliation
    Massoum says will press ahead with efforts to heal Iraq's sectarian rifts after meeting with UN envoy
    Fuad Masoum, the new president of Iraq and a veteran Kurdish politician, speaks during a press conference in Baghdad on July 24, 2014. (AFP PHOTO / ALI AL-SAADI)
    Fuad Masoum, the new president of Iraq and a veteran Kurdish politician, speaks during a press conference in Baghdad on July 24, 2014. (AFP PHOTO / ALI AL-SAADI)

    Baghdad, Asharq Al-Awsat—Iraqi President Fuad Massoum reaffirmed his intention to push forward a process of national political reconciliation on Tuesday, following a meeting with the UN Special Envoy to Iraq Nikolay Mladenov.
    “[The Iraqi government] is seeking to take decisive and resolute steps and reconsider some resolutions and laws in order to achieve national reconciliation and bring security and welfare,” a statement quoted Massoum as saying during a meeting with Mladenov.

    “National reconciliation is a social need; therefore, it cannot be achieved via meetings, conferences and pretense only. Rather, it requires strong will and actual participation from everyone, particularly since Iraq now is in need of reconciliation and solidarity more than ever,” the statement continued.

    Since the downfall of the former dictator Saddam Hussein following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iraq has been increasingly beset by bloody sectarian violence and conflict at all levels, the most recent example of which has been the rise of the Sunni extremist organization the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

    In particular, Iraq’s Sunnis, politically predominant in the pre-2003 era, have become increasingly disillusioned and disaffected by the rise of Shi’ite parties to power in Iraq, something experts say has contributed to the success of ISIS and groups like it.

    The US has called on the government of Shi’ite prime minister Haider Al-Abdadi to begin a reconciliation process with Iraqi Sunni leaders, and has warned that it will be necessary to integrate Sunni tribal militias into the security forces in order to defeat ISIS, something the previous government led by Nuri Al-Maliki was deeply reluctant to do.

    Massoum has tasked his Vice-President Iyad Allawi with following up on the issue of national reconciliation. The Shi’ite politician has held a series of meetings with exiled politicians and tribal leaders in Jordan, UAE and Qatar in a bid to involve them in the national reconciliation project.

    During his meeting with the UN special envoy, Massoum reiterated that “extensive national reconciliation is the only way to get rid of difficulties and help maintain security and social peace.”

    The United Nations would support Iraq in all fields and help it overcome its problems, Mladenov pledged.

    The Iraqi president told a group of reporters in November that he would “adopt an extensive national reconciliation project early next year.”

    “President Massoum possesses an integrated program and a clear vision regarding national reconciliation and once he is done with consultations and meetings, practical steps will begin,” a spokesman for the Iraqi presidency, Khalid Shawani, told Asharq Al-Awsat.

    According to Shawani, Massoum’s national reconciliation project will focus on two tracks: a political track, involving consultations with members of all of Iraq’s sects and ethnicities, and a legislative track, involving the review of existing legislation with an eye to fostering a greater degree of political and social reconciliation.

    The project will address several critical issues, such as the sectarian basis of Iraq’s political system (which unofficially reserves the presidency for a Kurd, the premiership for
    Last edited by chattels; 02-01-2015 at 11:53 AM.

  3. #3

    Jobouri calls to reveal investigations results

    Jobouri calls to reveal investigations results over security breaches

    Baghdad (AIN) –The parliament Speaker, Saleem al-Jobouri called to reveal the results of the investigations held for the security breaches to indicate the reasons and officials behind them.

  4. #4

    Central Bank of Iraq 12 / 2014

    Click on " Members of the Board of Directors "

    CBI Website :

    Central Bank of Iraq 12 / 2014

    Governing Bodies and Executive Board

    H.E. ( * His Excellency ) Ali Muhsin Ismail, Acting Governor, Head of the board

    ​NOTE : The Holiday Calendar has been updated ( 2015 ), which was not accomplished in recent year(s) until later on.


  5. #5

    US military: ISIS chemical weapons expert killed in Iraq

    US military: ISIS chemical weapons expert killed in Iraq

    WASHINGTON DC—American military officials said on Friday that airstrikes have killed an Islamic State (ISIS) chemical-weapons expert in Iraq.

    The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said in a statement that Abu Malik, an ISIS chemical-weapons engineer was killed by an airstrike on January 24 near Mosul.

    Abu Malik was said to have worked with the former regime of Saddam Hussein and joined the Al-Qaeda organization in 2005.

    The CENTCOM said that Abu Malik had worked at Al Muthanna chemical-weapon production facility during Hussein’s regime and that he had planned to attack Mosul with chemical weapons in an Al-Qaeda operation.

    US military officials believe that ISIS is working on chemical-weapons capabilities.

    As ISIS overran Mosul last June and seized Iraqi army bases, it also controlled the Al Muthanna chemical facility, which contained a stockpile of old weapons.

    Coalition forces have conducted more than 1,800 airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria since last August and according to Secretary of State John Kerry, the airstrikes have killed “half of the ISIS leadership.”

  6. #6

    Re: US military: ISIS chemical weapons expert killed in Iraq

    Legal expert calls for accelerating the deployment of the budget law in the Official Gazette to begin its implementation

    Called legal expert Tariq Harb, on Saturday, to speed up the deployment of the General Budget Law in the Official Gazette of the State in order to initiate action accordingly.

    He said the war in a statement received by all of Iraq [where], a copy of it today, "take Parliament Act 2015 budget legislation on Thursday faster than fast we need to expand the provision of peace and respect for the veneration of the Parliament on his move."

    He added that "Article 73 of the Constitution granted the President of the Republic to ratify the laws authority after legislation in Parliament and in order not to wait for a period of 15 days set by that article to approve the law in the absence of the President authentication, since Article 129 of the Constitution decided to work laws are after published in the Official Journal of the facts of Iraq] and after the president authentication or after a period of 15 days in the case of non-ratification, and that's where the budget law contains many commitments, such as imposing sums on the use of mobile and deductions from the salaries of the highest degrees and meet payments on imported cars and other obligations that can not be implemented until after the President of the Republic authentication or wait 15 days and the dissemination of the law in the Official Gazette, then it requires the ratification of all these actors and the speed of deployment speed in order to implement the provisions of the Budget Law. "

    The House of Representatives, passed in its last Thursday evening, the General Budget Law of $ 119 trillion dinars and a deficit of 25 trillion .

    courtesy of the iqd team

    Research : Iraqi Constitution ; Article 73:

    The President of the Republic shall assume the following powers:


    Second: ......................

    Third: To ratify and issue the laws enacted by the Council of Representatives. Such
    laws are considered ratified after fifteen days from the date of receipt by the


    Article 129: Iraqi Constitution

    Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall take effect on the date of their
    publication, unless stipulated otherwise.

    Last edited by chattels; 01-31-2015 at 12:38 PM.

  7. #7
    Join Date
    May 2012
    Caribean Islands

    Re: The Dinar Daily, Saturday January 31, 2015

  8. #8

    Rafidain Bank issued card [MasterCard] to customers both inside and outside Iraq

    Rafidain Bank issued card [MasterCard] to customers both inside and outside Iraq

    Rafidain Bank, announced on Saturday for Mbacherth issuing card [MasterCard] to its customers in its branches inside and outside Iraq.

    According to a statement of the bank, the agency received all of Iraq [where], a copy of it today, "The bank issued a pilot of MasterCard cards offering used all over the world for being a manifestation of modernism in the banking business."

    He explained that "this service check several privileges the most important dispense the use of paper money."

    The statement noted that "cardholder can also withdraw his money from his own account in any province or state be present without the need to carry cash."

    The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, called in earlier this month, ministries and departments not related to the Ministry and the provinces all urged the staff to use the smart card instead of cash in order to "cash trading to reduce their high risk, and maximize liquidity in Iraqi banks, and the expansion of credit capabilities, including achieves stimulate economic and investment activities, "noting that" those banks willing to provide deposit and withdrawal outlets in places that fit employees' .anthy

  9. #9

    Jubouri: Parliament has become more able to enact laws and call on the government to

    Jubouri: Parliament has become more able to enact laws and call on the government to carry out a general amnesty law

    The head of the House of Representatives Saleem al-Jubouri, Saturday, Parliament's ability to achieve harmony and enact laws, calling on the Council of Ministers to approve the amnesty law and send it to the legislature for discussion and voting on it has to be one of the foundations of reconciliation.

    Jubouri said in his speech to the National Conference of dialogue between religions and sects, which was held in Baghdad today, "brings us together today harmony title Manvin it as meaning Sami aspire to get to the farthest point in the form and content Mgesdan our need and Dharoratna urgency in the disintegration and conflict and suspicion and mistrust time, so I find myself today in need of a lot of clarity in the touch the wound revealed what simmered in deposits, surpassing the frequency and considerations orbits. "

    He added: "Today we desperately need to raise the new slogan address [frank with each other to reconcile] no reconciliation before frankness and depth of the valley in what is going on that was so painful or embarrassing Valm today and embarrass him much lighter than the results tomorrow and remorse."

    He said he "has to be careful while baptizing others to ride the wave of opinion idiosyncratic to make it a separation of a weapon in the loyalty and disavowal door and blow the fire of that burn us to burn everything and everybody from our brothers that are guaranteed by our grand nation's identity, also has to be careful when we see the field is packed However, armed terrorist Daash which united today to face and hand kills citizens under the sectarian element, sex, religion suppository to implement his belongings despicable and heinous Gererth likely the nation. "

    He called al-Jubouri to "accelerate the disclosure of the results of the parliamentary and government committees investigating crimes that are made to the announcement of the results to prevent bloodshed and cut the root of sedition."

    He continued, "I still recalled Ammar al-Hakim Initiative [Anbarna steadfast] out of the crisis and cordoned off and maybe we did not we go through what we have faced since they include the establishment of self-defense of the Anbar tribes and the task of the international border and strategic roads insurance in the province and integrated formations of the Iraqi army that especially in the forces are Anbar province, and led her sons, "he said, adding that he" was on everyone's time to listen to this initiative seeks to Thakaha is that resorting to otherwise instructed Iraq the high price and income because of the spiral row and lost from the virus a lot of lives and money and effort. "

    He believed that "the opportunity still exists to bring the initiative to the road through the integrated reconciliation project that awaits everyone in the near, and I think that the best prelude to take place is to complete a paper application of the political agreement, and here I applaud Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and his quest and his work on the completion of this paper is included in the government program and became a penalty of commitment. "

    He said al-Jubouri that "the harmony that we seek today needs a solid platform achieved in understanding the partners on the definition of partnership needs harmony as well as the awareness and the culture of a new language of dialogue based on understanding the controversy project to embark on assets The difference, which leads to differentiate the floor and hostile to the nation can not be justified or acceptance or support. "

    He stressed that "the House of Representatives has become more able to achieve harmony through his quest to enact legislation flowing into the meaning and coalesce with the tools and applications, and those laws that are still needed to support the political blocs to achieved by the House of Representatives is the general amnesty law, which stems from the spirit of harmony."

    He said the "amnesty, which we are talking about is not the release of innocent people languishing in prisons for long periods They are waiting for an apology, but I mean amnesty to those who sinned came the opportunity to correct the path and back to the right path, to be a component of a national actor to build the country, taking into account the rights of those innocent victims who were targeted innocent and this occasion, I call on the Council of Ministers to speed up the approval and send it to the House for discussion and voting on it to be one of the foundations of reconciliation that we seek ".

  10. #10

    Re: Jubouri: Parliament has become more able to enact laws and call on the government

    Anbar: Washington officials require the approval of Baghdad for our armament is ready to intensify overflights

    Long-Presse / Anbar One of the members of the government and the tribal delegation that visited Washington revealed on Saturday that Washington had agreed to arm and train the security forces and the people of Anbar tribes provided the Iraqi government approval, and as pointed out that the meetings of the delegation with a number of government officials in America have been fruitful, he stressed that the US side expressed its readiness to intensify air sorties against al (Daash).

    Said Mayor spend modern one members of the government and the tribal delegation that visited Washington Abdul Hakim Aljughaifi in an interview to the (long-Presse), that "the American side agreed to train and equip and support the security forces and members of tribes in Anbar province, provided the Iraqi government approval and under its supervision."

    He Aljughaifi, that "the meetings the delegation a number of US government officials have been fruitful," stressing that "the American side expressed its readiness to intensify sorties to destroy strongholds (Daash) in Anbar and support ground pieces of the army and police and fighters of the tribes in the purge cities of the province battles."

    He Aljughaifi, that "the American Anbaria talks also yielded to intensify efforts in the training of security forces and fighters of the clans by American advisers in Ain al-Assad Air Base in hand-Baghdadi west of the province, and the opening of an air bridge to transport military and combat supplies from Baghdadi to gray and Amiriyat al-Fallujah, modern and regions that will be freed. "

    The Anbar Provincial Council announced, in (January 17, 2015), from leaving the political and tribal delegation to the United States for supporting Washington in the war against al (Daash), as he emphasized that the delegation headed by the Governor Suhaib al-Rawi.

    He met with delegations representing Anbar, earlier, the US ambassador in Baghdad and some Western officials, and posed the question of access to armament, while their response was that the provision of military support conditional on the approval of the Iraqi government.

    The Special Envoy of US President Barack Obama, on Wednesday (January 14, 2015), that the United States supplied Iraq with weapons and equipment worth $ 500 million over the past year in 2014, and while stressing that his country will coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense for arming Sunni tribes and will not do so directly , pointed out that Washington was working on a "review" strategy to support Iraq in order to be "effective."

    It is noteworthy that the organization (Daash) controls the most prominent cities of Anbar almost a year ago on the events and battles and confrontations between security and tribal forces and highlighted the areas that are under the control of the organization is Fallujah and Qaim Alhdodian between Iraq and Syria, Hit, Rawa and other aspects of them near the borders of the capital Baghdad vine Fallujah .

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts